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Abstract
This thesis is a reflection of the provisions of the Rome Statute in relation to the most
fundamental condition for the effective functioning of the Court – the cooperation of
states. It broadly examines the challenges experienced by the Court with respect to
application of Part IX such as whether non-State Parties to the Rome Statute can,
notwithstanding their right not to be party, be compelled to cooperate with the Court
owing to the customary international law obligation for all States to repress, find and
punish persons alleged to have committed the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide). This is particularly
challenging where such persons are nationals of non-States Parties. The various
meanings of international cooperation in criminal matters is discussed with reference
to and distinguished from the cooperation regime of the International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
For States Parties to the Rome Statute, the thesis evaluates the measure of their
inability or unwillingness to genuinely prosecute persons alleged to have committed
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court within the context of the principle of
complementarity. It seeks to address, where such inability or unwillingness has been
determined by the Court, how effective the cooperation between the States Parties and
the Court could best serve the interests of justice. The thesis answers the question on
what extent the principle of complementarity influences the cooperation of States with
the Court, whether or not these States are party to the Rome Statute. The concept of
positive complementarity that establishes a measure of cooperation between the Court
and the national criminal jurisdictions is further explored in the context of the Court’s
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capacity to strengthen local ownership of the enforcement of international criminal
justice.
A nuanced discussion on the practice of the Court with respect to the right of persons
before the Court is developed. The rights of an accused in different phases of Court
proceedings and the rights of victims and affected communities of crimes within the
Court’s jurisdiction are considered at length and in the light of recently-established
principles regulating the Court’s treatment of these individuals. These persons are key
interlocutors in the international criminal justice system and have shifted the
traditional focus of international law predominantly from states to individuals and
bring about a different kind of relationship between States as a collective and their
treatment of these individuals arising from obligations to the Rome Statute.
Finally the thesis interrogates the enforcement mechanisms under the Rome Statute.
Unlike States, the Court does not have an enforcement entity such as a Police Force
that would arrest persons accused of committing crimes within its jurisdiction,
conduct searches and seizures or compel witnesses to appear before the Court. Yet,
the Court must critically assess its practice of enforcing sentences that it imposes on
convicted persons and in its contribution to restorative justice, the enforcement of
reparations orders in collaboration with other Rome Statute entities such as the Trust
Fund for Victims.
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vOpsomming
Hierdie tesis is 'n weerspieëling van die bepalings van die Statuut van Rome in
verhouding tot die mees fundamentele voorwaarde vir die effektiewe funksionering
van die Hof - die samewerking van State. Dit ondersoek breedweg die uitdagings wat
deur die Hof ervaar word met betrekking tot die toepassing van Deel IX soos
byvoorbeeld of State wat nie partye is tot die Statuut van Rome, nieteenstaande hul
reg om nie deel te wees nie, verplig kan word om saam te werk met die Hof weens die
internasionale gewoontereg verpligting om alle persone wat na bewering misdade
gepleeg het binne die jurisdiksie van die Hof (oorlogsmisdade, misdade teen die
mensdom en volksmoord) te verhinder, vind en straf. Dit is veral uitdagend waar
sodanige persone burgers is van State wat nie partye is nie. Die verskillende
betekenisse van die internasionale samewerking in kriminele sake word bespreek met
verwysing na, en onderskei van, die samewerkende stelsel van die Internasionale
Kriminele Tribunale vir Rwanda en die voormalige Joego-Slawië.
Vir State wat partye is tot die Statuut van Rome, evalueer die tesis - in die konteks
van die beginsel van komplementariteit - die mate van hul onvermoë, of
ongewilligheid om werklik persone te vervolg wat na bewering misdade gepleeg het
binne die jurisdiksie van die Hof. Dit poog om aan te spreek, waar so 'n onvermoë of
ongewilligheid bepaal is deur die Hof, hoe effektiewe samewerking tussen State wat
partye is en die Hof, die belange van geregtigheid die beste kan dien. Die tesis
beantwoord die vraag op watter mate die beginsel van komplementariteit die
samewerking van die State met die Hof beïnvloed, ongeag of hierdie State partye is
tot die Statuut van Rome. Die konsep van positiewe komplementariteit wat
samewerking vestig tussen die Hof en die nasionale jurisdiksies aangaande kriminele
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sake word verder ondersoek in die konteks van die Hof se vermoë om plaaslike
eienaarskap in die handhawing van die internasionale kriminele regstelsel te versterk.
'n Genuanseerde bespreking op die praktyk van die Hof met betrekking tot die reg van
persone voor die Hof word ontwikkel. Die regte van 'n beskuldigde in die verskillende
fases van die hof verrigtinge en die regte van slagoffers en geaffekteerde
gemeenskappe van misdade binne die hof se jurisdiksie word in diepte bespreek in die
lig van die onlangs gevestigde beginsels wat die Hof se behandeling van hierdie
individue reguleer. Hierdie persone is sleutel gespreksgenote in die internasionale
kriminele regstelsel en het die tradisionele fokus verskuif van die internasionale reg
van State na individue, en bring oor 'n ander soort verhouding tussen State as 'n
kollektiewe en hulle behandeling van hierdie individue as gevolg van hul verpligtinge
aan die Statuut van Rome.
Ten slotte bevraagteken die tesis die handhawings meganismes onder die Statuut van
Rome. In teenstelling met State, het die Hof nie 'n handhawing entiteit soos 'n
Polisiemag wat persone kon arresteer wat beskuldig word van misdade binne sy
jurisdiksie, deursoek en beslagleggings uitvoer of persone dwing om as getuies te
verskyn voor die Hof nie. Tog, moet die Hof sy praktyk van uitvoering van vonnisse
wat dit oplê op veroordeelde persone en in sy bydrae tot herstellende geregtigheid die
handhawing van herstelling in samewerking met ander Statuut van Rome entiteite
soos die Trust Fonds vir Slagoffers krities assesseer.
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1CHAPTER I
International Cooperation with the International Criminal Court
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Legal framework for cooperation among States in criminal matters
1.3 Cooperation of States with the ad hoc Tribunals
1.4 Cooperation by States under the Rome Statute
1.5 Cooperation by African States with the Court
1.6 Conclusion
The ICC...is totally dependent on full, effective, timely and predictable
cooperation, particularly from States Parties.
- ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Judge Hans Peter-Kaul
1.1 INTRODUCTION
International cooperation and judicial assistance in criminal matters is the subject of
Part IX of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (“Rome
Statute”).1 This Part IX of the Rome Statute represents a novelty in its provisions
concerning international cooperation and judicial assistance in criminal matters with
respect to the obligations therein for States Parties. This is in marked contrast to the
cooperation and judicial assistance in criminal matters before the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (“ad hoc Tribunals”) as
well as inter-State cooperation on criminal matters.
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998);
2187 UNTS 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [accessed 5 February 2010]
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2The International Criminal Court (“Court”) is not endowed with police or military
forces authorised and empowered to apprehend suspects or to gather evidence. For
these tasks, the Court depends, as the two ad hoc tribunals do, on the cooperation of
existing national criminal justice systems.2 The regime of cooperation of the ad hoc
tribunals and the Court bears noteworthy distinctions defined by the manner in which
these international institutions were established. This Chapter will reflect on the
cooperation regime at the ad hoc Tribunals as well as the cooperation regime under
the Rome Statute.
The ad hoc Tribunals were formed pursuant to Chapter VII actions of the United
Nations Security Council.3 Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations imposes a
duty on all Member States ‘to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the Charter.’4 All States are therefore obligated to
2 A. Ciampi, The Obligation to Cooperate, in Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays
in Honour of Adriaan Bos, edited by H.A.M. Von Hebel, J.G. Lammers and J. Schukking (1998)
(OUP), 1607 -1638, at 1607-8
3 See Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993) Security Council
Resolution 827 (1993) on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, (1993) ILM 1192; as amended by Security Council Resolution 1166 of 13 May
1998, available at http://www.un.org/icty/ [accessed 5 February 2010]. Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994, available at http://www.un.org/ictr [accessed 5 February 2010]
4 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html [accessed 5 February 2010].
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3cooperate with the ad hoc Tribunals as an obligation erga omnes.5 In addition to this,
Article 103 of the Charter provides that:
‘...in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’
In essence, nothing under international law of treaties can hinder the cooperation
between the ad hoc Tribunals and Member States of the United Nations.
The regime of cooperation under the Rome Statute is governed by a different set of
rules. The Rome Statute, itself being a creature of treaty by States, is limited to the
rules of international law concerning treaties.6 With respect to Part IX of the Rome
Statute (“Part IX”), obligations to cooperate and assist the Court are limited to States
that are party to the Rome Statute.7 Only in limited cases where situations are referred
to the Court by the Security Council,8 and it is arguable whether the drafters of Part
IX envisaged this, may non-States Parties be said to have a duty to cooperate with the
Court.
5 Obligations erga omnes are obligations recognized in international law as owed by States towards the
community of States as a whole. See Barcelona Traction case [Belgium v. Spain] (Second Phase) ICJ
Rep 1970 3 par 33 “…an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes. [at 34] Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international
law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination.”
6 The Rome Statute as an international treaty only binds States which are parties to it. This is in
accordance with a well-established principle of international law. For a restatement of this rule, see Art.
34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: ‘A treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent’
7 A. Ciampi, supra note 2, at 1608
8 Art. 13 (b) Rome Statute, supra note 1
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4Whereas provisions in Part IX were agreed upon by the negotiators of the Rome
Statute, the practical aspects of its application present a challenge to practitioners of
international criminal law. The novelty of the treaty obligations, in as much as it
marks a milestone in the development of international criminal law, presents a
significant challenge for its application.
Traditionally, the sources of international law have been listed under Article 38 (1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice as: i) international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the
contesting States; ii) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law; iii) the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations; and iv)
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Commentators have argued whether the list of sources appears in a hierarchy as to
their application. The challenge with respect to application of Part IX is whether non-
States Parties to the Rome Statute can, notwithstanding their right not to be party, be
compelled to cooperate with the Court owing to the customary international law
obligation for all States to repress, find and punish persons alleged to have committed
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court - war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide (core crimes). This is particularly challenging where persons suspected
of committing these core crimes are nationals of non-States Parties. With respect to
States Parties to the Rome Statute, several questions pertaining to cooperation exist,
inter alia: what is the measure of their inability or unwillingness to genuinely
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5prosecute persons alleged to have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court? Where such inability or unwillingness has been determined by the Court, how
effective will the cooperation between the State Party and the Court be to serve the
interests of justice? Chapter II will discuss some of the nuances pertaining to the
Court’s Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers views on complementarity.
Part IX provides for the arrest and surrender of persons to the Court. These provisions
have been greatly influenced by the experience of the ad hoc Tribunals.9 With this
being key to the functioning of the Court, there is a need to ensure that the process of
arrest and surrender conform to the obligations on States to ensure the protection of
human rights of the persons being surrendered to the Court. Questions to consider
include: what effect does the infringement of his or her human rights during arrest and
surrender to the Court have to the trial of the accused person and whether there are
circumstances where the violations of the rights of the accused that would be so grave
as to lead to an acquittal or mitigated sentence. Trial Chamber I in the Decision on
Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
considered the cooperation of the accused with the Court despite onerous
circumstances presented by the former Prosecutor Mr. Louis Moreno-Ocampo,
including failure to comply with evidence disclosure requirements ordered by the
Chamber and infringement of the accused’s right to a fair trial.10 With respect to the
above, further questions to address include: what the effect is of amnesties and
immunities, if at all; and what effect do they have on the arrest and surrender of an
accused and the extent of cooperation between States and the Court. The rich
9 Calvo-Guller K. N, The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court (2006) (Martinus
Nijhoff) at 17.
10 See “Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76”, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case
No.: ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber, 10 July 2012, paras. 88-91.
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special tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) and the
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) can (although not
conclusively) shed light on both the procedural and substantive questions raised
above. Chapter III will reflect on these issues on some detail.
Finally, it is incontrovertible that the Court will and does depend on the cooperation
of States11 to be able to arrest persons alleged to have committed crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court as provided by the Rome Statute, transfer these persons to the
seat of the Court, perform searches and seizures in the territory of States if individuals
refuse to cooperate, or compel reluctant witnesses to appear before the Court.12
Without a mechanism of enforcement, the Court’s survival and scope of influence is
severely challenged despite the elaborate provisions in Part IX. The question remains:
what means of enforcement does the Court have for its survival, or is it the proverbial
‘giant without arms and legs’ who ‘needs artificial limbs to walk and work.’13 The
opportunities and challenges of the Court’s enforcement mechanisms will be
discussed in Chapter IV.
1.2 Legal framework for cooperation among States in criminal matters
11 See “Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 18 July 1997”, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskić, Case No.: IT-95-14-AR108 bis,
Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997, para. 26.
12 B Swart, General Problems. In Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of
Adriaan Bos, edited by H.A.M. Von Hebel, J.G. Lammers and J. Schukking, 1589
13 A Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law’ 9 EJIL (1998) 1, at 13
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assistance between States. This form of collaboration between States is based on the
respect of the sovereignty of States. Jurisdiction is an attribute of a State’s
sovereignty.14 It is trite law that there are jurisdictional limits for courts concerning
criminal matters. Criminal jurisdiction of States is primarily exercised on a territorial
basis. This means that jurisdiction is primarily limited to crimes that occur in a State’s
territory and by its nationals under the active personality principle.15 The
extraterritoriality of criminal jurisdiction exercised by any State depends on the
cooperation among States to apprehend individuals who are nationals of a requested
State but have committed crimes in the requesting State or who are nationals of the
requesting State but resident – in hiding or otherwise – in the requested State. The
rationale is that where a crime has been committed, the perpetrator of the crime must
not escape trial by virtue of territorial jurisdictional limitation. This form of
cooperation by States can be described as horizontal in that the requesting and
requested States are considered as at par in the fight against impunity for crimes
committed regardless of where they were committed.
The framework of inter-State of horizontal cooperation relies to a large extent on the
law of extraditions. In addition to there being an explicit and written extradition treaty
between States, there are two other requirements with respect to successful
extraditions under international law. The first is the double criminality rule, which
14 A State’s jurisdiction refers to the competence of the State to govern persons and property by its
criminal and civil law.
15 Active personality jurisdiction exercised by court based on the nationality of the perpetrator of the
crime whereas passive personality jurisdiction is exercised by the courts of the nationality of the victim
of the crime; See Watson GR “The Passive Personality Principle” 28 Texas International Law Journal
1 (1993) and Hathaway OA, “Between Power and Principle: An integrated Theory of International
Law” 71 University of Chicago Law Review (2005) 1, where the active personality and passive
personality principles of jurisdiction are defined and explained.
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crime prohibited by law in both the requesting and requested State. The second is that
the accused person cannot be transferred from a requested State to the requesting State
to stand trial for a crime where the law of the requesting state prescribes the death
penalty as the penalty for the crime. The case Mohamed and Another v. President of
the Republic of South Africa and Others before the Constitutional Court of South
Africa highlights these requirements and particularly second condition above
mentioned for a lawful extradition of a suspect from one jurisdiction to another.16 The
Constitutional Court ruled that the South African government may not extradite a
suspect who may face the death penalty without seeking an assurance from the
receiving country – in this case the United States of America - that the suspect will
not be sentenced to death.
A challenge with this particular model of cooperation on criminal matters becomes
evident where there is a gap in the laws of the requesting or requested State on the
specific crimes that the perpetrator is suspected of committing and the prerogative of
legislative entities in any given State to determine what kind of punishment is merited
for a particular crime. The debate around the abolition of the death penalty rages on
with proponents and opponents not running out of arguments in support and defense
of their convictions.
1.3 Cooperation of States with the ad hoc Tribunals
16 Mohamed and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 (3) SA 893
(CC).
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nationals who are accused of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide in their territories. In response to the gross violations of human rights and
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols
during the Balkans conflict in the early 1990s, the United Nations Security Council
(“UNSC”) established an international criminal tribunal to deal with war crimes that
took place during the conflicts in the Balkans.17 A similar international tribunal was
established by the UNSC regarding the genocide that took place in Rwanda.18
In Prosecutor v. Timohir Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY remarked that
cooperation in criminal matters between the ICTY and by extension the ICTR and
States is ‘vertical’.19 The Statutes that created the ICTY and ICTR give primacy of
jurisdiction for the crimes within the jurisdiction of these tribunals to the tribunals
over the jurisdiction of States. The standard at the time for the prosecution of crimes
of an international nature was that individual States had an obligation arising from the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 – also a customary international law norm to punish
individuals who are suspected of committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law (that is war crimes).20 The primacy of jurisdiction lying with the
17 Supra note 3; See also United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993
established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for the serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 with
its seat in The Hague available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_808_1993_en.pdf [accessed 3 October
2012].
18 Supra note 3; See also United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994
established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committee din the territory of Rwanda between 1
January1994 and 31 December 1994 with its seat in Arusha available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Resolutions/English/955e.pdf [accessed 3 October
2012].
19 Prosecutor v. Timohir Blaškić, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997, IT-99-14-AR 108bis, para. 47
and 54.
20 Henckaerts J. and Doswald-Beck L., Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules,
(2005) (Cambridge University Press), xvi
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ICTY and ICTR meant that the States of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in
particular were to arrest and surrender accused persons within their territories to the
ICTY and ICTR for trial.
Many of the persons indicted, particularly by the Prosecutor of the ICTR were
resident in other countries outside Rwanda. The obligation to cooperate with the ICTR
in those cases arose from specific statutory provisions relating to this. Cooperation by
other States for the arrest and surrender of persons indicted by the Prosecutors of the
ICTY and the ICTR is an obligation arising from obligations by all Member States of
the UN to comply with UNSC Resolutions under article 25 of the UN Charter. There
are however limitations in this model of cooperation. During the course of the ICTR’s
mandate, Rwanda asserted its interest in conducting its own trials for the genocidaires
and there were numerous diplomatic interventions to resolve the matter. The ICTR
remained with primary jurisdiction over any person alleged to have participated in the
1994 genocide. There have been cases which have since been transferred to Rwanda
for adjudication as part of the completion strategy of the ICTR. Other challenges that
this model of cooperation has experienced include the harbouring of suspects in States
that are not willing to acknowledge that the suspects are in their territories. The ICTR
indictment for Felicien Kabuga who is said to have financed the media house Radio
Television des Milles Collines and Kangura newspaper, which propagated genocide
messages in 1994 in Rwanda, remains outstanding. It is widely believed that the
wealthy businessman is in hiding in Kenya under the protection of the government or
some influential figures in the country.
1.4 Cooperation by States under the Rome Statute
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States have an obligation to cooperate with the Court. Article 86 of the Rome Statute
provides that:
‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute,
cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.’
Wallace argues that under international law, a treaty, although it may be identified
as comparable in some degree to a Parliamentary Statute within municipal law,
differs from the latter in that it only applies to those States which have expressly
agreed to its terms.21 States which have agreed to the terms of the Rome Statute
by ratification are bound by the terms of the treaty provisions.22 The process of
ratification is recognized as indication by a State that it is in full agreement with
the letter of the law contained in the treaty. Within the spirit of the treaty, a
consenting State covenants not to depart from the obligations placed upon it as
much as it will seek to enjoy the benefits derived from the treaty’s provisions. In
the same vein, States that have not ratified the Rome Statute, but have signed the
treaty are bound as a matter of practice to the spirit of the treaty.23 Article 125 of
the Rome Statute on signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
stipulates that the ‘…Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
signatory States.’ The process of ratification, acceptance or approval by a State
must be preceded by consent through signing of the Rome Statute by the
21 See Rebecca M.M. Wallace International Law 5th (2009) 20.
22 As at the time of this writing, there are 121 States that have ratified the Rome Statute. The Rome
Statute does not have universal application at this time, although there are campaigns by civil society
organizations in the world for universalism.
23 The following countries participated in the negotiations between States prior to the adoption of the
Rome Statute, and appended their signatures to the treaty: Egypt, India, Russia and the United States of
America – which has since declared that it has withdrawn its signature from the treaty.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
12
legitimate authority in any given State. Consent by signing is consequently
indicative to a certain measure of the intention by States to be bound by the spirit
of the treaty.24
Requests for cooperation from States Parties are made by the Court.25 It is the
primary responsibility of the Court to make these requests for its efficient
working. These requests according to the general provisions for cooperation
contained in Article 87 of the Rome Statute are to be made through the States
Parties designated diplomatic channels and in the language chosen by States at the
time of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. The Court may elect to use
international organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization
and regional organizations to effect its request for cooperation from a State
Party.26 The relationship between the Court and inter-State entities is also
regulated by the Rome Statute. The working relationship between the United
Nations (“UN”) and the Court mentioned in Article 2 of the Rome Statute is
explicitly substantiated in Part IX of the Rome Statute.27 The UNSC may be
called upon to intervene in the case where a State Party and interestingly a State
24 Article 12 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for the consent to be bound by
a treaty expressed by signing. Whereas the provision is clear that this form of consent applies where the
treaty specifically addresses the issue of acceptance of the treaty provisions by the signature of state
representatives, one can reach a logical conclusion that any state that sends representatives to
international conferences where adoption of a treaty happens, such state unless it indicates otherwise
during the adoption process, is wholly committed to the terms of the adopted treaty, although the
specific obligations contained in the treaty provisions may not apply outside formal exchange of
instruments of ratification.
25 Article 87 Rome Statute supra note 1.
26 Article 87 (1) (b) Rome Statute supra note 1.
27 Article 2 Rome Statute supra note 1 reads that:
The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to
be approved by the Assembly of State Parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the
President of the Court on its behalf.
This agreement between the two inter-governmental organizations has been concluded.
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not party to the Rome Statute fails to cooperate with requests from the Court.28
UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) with respect to the situation in Darfur, Sudan is an
example of action taken by the UNSC in accordance with the Rome Statute.29
In carrying out its responsibility as the primary body mandated to make orders
requesting the cooperation of States Parties, the Court:
‘…may take such measures, including measures related to the protection
of information, as may be necessary to ensure the safety or physical or
psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their
families.’ 30
These considerations for the well-being of victims, potential witnesses and their
families – individuals in a system of law concerning nations – in the process of
requesting the cooperation of States Parties with the Court are a strong indication
of the centrality of this category of persons during the negotiations in Rome for a
permanent international criminal court and the aftermath of its establishment. By
fate or chance, the drafters of the Rome Statute left an indelible mark protecting
these individuals in the international criminal justice system.
28 Article 87 (5) (b) Rome Statute supra note 1. It is interesting to note that although the general rule is
that treaties do not create obligations or rights for third parties in accordance with Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the drafters of the Rome Statute were aware that prior to
the universalisation of the Rome Statute, there is a need to have ‘catch all’ provisions in the Rome
Statute to ensure that the true spirit of creating a permanent international criminal court to deal with
crimes of a serious nature, are not impeded by technicalities in international law. The mechanisms of
the United Nations Security Council are employed in this manner.
29 Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to
the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya,
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 27 August 2010.
30 Article 87 (4) Rome Statute supra note 1.
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Since the Court has the responsibility to make requests for cooperation from
States in accordance with Article 87, there is a case to argue for a State that does
not cooperate with the Court for lack of a specific request by the Court for this
cooperation. It would be very rare for this sort of situation to exist as the Court
constantly reiterates the necessity of State cooperation to fulfil its mandate. It is
however, also possible to interpret this requirement for cooperation to be limited
the State of nationality of the accused and territory where the crime was
committed. It would be unrealistic to impute non-cooperation of States Party
outside of the general good faith of being treaty-bound, without the explicit
request to that State Party by the Court for cooperation. It is arguable however in
the situation in Darfur, The Sudan where there is an outstanding warrant of arrest
for the Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir and other high-ranking government
officials, that although no specific request had been made by the Court to
countries such as Kenya and Chad, their unwillingness or inability to arrest and
surrender President Bashir is a reflection of their commitment to cooperating with
the Court at the time of Bashir’s visits to the respective countries. Both Chad and
Kenya are States Parties to the Rome Statute and failed to arrest President Bashir
while he was in these countries. When brought to task over her commitment to
cooperating with the Court, Kenya has maintained its full commitment to its
obligations under the Rome Statute.31 Perhaps to prevent future excuses by States
Party to the Rome Statute from their obligation to cooperate with the Court, the
request for cooperation by the Court to a State Party must be specific even where
31 Most recently, news reports that the Attorney General of Kenya received a letter from the Head of
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation in the ICC Prosecutor’s Office complaining of tardy
responses from Kenya in the ongoing investigations and soon-to-commence trials of four Kenyans at
the ICC. The Attorney General maintained that Kenya is committed to the Rome Statute regime. See
All Africa article “Kenya: Githu Passes the Buck Over ICC” available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/201210020046.html [accessed 5 October 2012].
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the request is made to the State of nationality of the accused or State where the
crimes in question were committed. This can avert situations where the a State is
castigated for not cooperating with the Court, especially where the request for
cooperation is either in conflict with other obligations of the State or there are
multiple and conflicting requests from different organs of the Court.  This would
be in line with inter-State cooperation in criminal matters, where the request is
specific to a particular matter and directed on a case by case basis.
The Court may also make arrangements on an ad hoc basis requesting the cooperation
of a State not Party to the Rome Statute.32 Prior to Cote d’Ivoire becoming a State
Party to the Rome Statute, it entered into an ad hoc arrangement with the Court and it
is on this basis that Cote d’Ivoire was able to make a referral of the situation
concerning the 2009 post-election violence in that country to the Court. This can be a
strategy that the Court may wish to employ in negotiations with States that are not
willing to fully bind themselves to the provisions of the Rome Statute but are willing
to join the fight against impunity for international crimes and may be amenable to
agreements with the Court on specific issues.
In order for States to cooperate effectively with the Court, Article 88 of the Rome
Statute explicitly provides that there needs to be systems and procedures existing
within States to regulate all forms of cooperation specified by the Rome Statute. It is
the duty of each State Party to enact enabling laws and regulations to allow it to fulfil
its obligation to cooperate with the Court when called upon to do so.
32 Article 87 (5) (a) Rome Statute supra note 1.
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The domestication of the Rome Statute presented a challenge to a number of States
Parties. African States constitute the largest block of States Parties to the Rome
Statute.33 Of the thirty-three States Parties from the continent, only a half have made
efforts to domesticate the Rome Statute.34 Some of these States laws only provide for
either complementarity or cooperation clauses and are fraught with implementation
problems. There is a need to standardize or provide guidance for the process of
domestication of the Rome Statute. This will allow for State Parties to make adequate
provisions to effectively cooperate with the Court when called upon so to act. There
are instances where enacted implementing legislation of the Rome Statute has led to
the arrest and surrender of suspects. Callixte Mbarushimana, a Rwandan national
allegedly linked to one of the rebel groups operating in the Ituri Province, Democratic
Republic of Congo (“DRC”), was extradited from France to The Hague in 2010 to
face charges of war crimes in the DRC. Although the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber
declined to confirm criminal charges brought against him by the Prosecutor, the
precedence set will be useful for future Court requests for cooperation to effect arrest
warrants.
Article 89 provides that
‘The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a
person…to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and
33 At the time of this writing, 33 African states are party to the Rome Statute.
34 As at the time of this writing the following African countries have implementing legislation at either
draft stage or enacted laws (domesticating) with cooperation and complementarity provisions: Benin,
Botswana, Burundi, Congo (Republic of), Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. See “Amnesty
International: The ICC Summary of draft and enacted complementing legislation as at April 2006”
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/AI_Implementation_factsheet06Nov14.pdf [accessed 5
October 2012].
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shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such
a person.’
The lexical reading of this provision is that the Court can make requests for arrest and
surrender to both States Parties and non-State Parties. This provision purports to
empower the Court to take certain actions in respect to States that are not signatories
to the Rome Statute. In this case, the Court has the capacity to request a non-State
Party to arrest and surrender a person who is suspected of having committed crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.  In keeping with the law of treaties, however the
non-States Parties are not obliged to act on the request thereby buttressing the
argument that the international legal system is still based on State sovereignty.35 The
article proceeds to qualify that ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions
of this Part and the procedure under national law, comply with the requests for arrest
and surrender.’36 On reading this article, one gets the sense that the negotiators at the
Rome conference that adopted the Rome Statute were involved in serious
considerations of addressing international crimes of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and aggression. Owing to the heinous nature of these crimes,
persons suspected of committing these crimes should not be shielded from arrest and
surrender owing to the non-applicability of the Rome Statute to non-States Parties.
This idealistic view must however face the realpolitik that States are confronted with
in their relations with one another.
35 For more arguments on the international legal system entrenched on the principle of state
sovereignty, see Gerhard Kemp ‘Foreign relations, international co-operation in criminal matters and
the position of the individual’ South African Journal of Criminal Justice (3) 2003 368-392, 373 where
he argues that ‘despite utopian references to ‘globalisation’, the international legal system is still firmly
premised on the existence of sovereign states and all that this entails. Even recent international
instruments stress its importance and oblige signatories to respect it…’; See also Max Huber’s
comments in the Island of Palmas case.
36 Article 89 (1) Rome Statute supra note 1.
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1.5 Cooperation by African States with the Court
The Court only has jurisdiction over individuals.37Outside of these individuals
voluntarily surrendering themselves to the Court pursuant to a summons to appear or a
warrant for arrest, the Court has not been endowed with an apparatus enabling it to
implement decisions on the territory of States.38 Swart observes that ‘in these and
other respects, the Court depends on the cooperation of States.’39 It is therefore
arguable that an ideal situation where the Court would function in a seamless fashion
is where the trigger mechanism for its jurisdiction is a referral by a State Party
pursuant to Article 14. Four referrals have been made to the Court at the time of this
writing. The first concerns Uganda,40 the second concerns the DRC,41 the third is the
situation in the Central African Republic42 and the final situation is that concerning
Côte d’Ivoire.
37 Article 25 (1) of the Rome Statute (supra) provides that “The Court shall have jurisdiction over
natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”
38 In terms of Article 58 of the Rome Statute (supra), “…the Pre- Trial Chamber [of the ICC] shall
issue a warrant of arrest for a person…. [after] having examined the application and the evidence or
other information submitted by the Prosecutor… [and] it is satisfied that … [t]here are reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and the
arrest of the person appears necessary.”  Alternatively “…to seeking a warrant of arrest, the
Prosecutor may submit an application requesting that the Pre- Trial Chamber issues a summons for
the person to appear…” and the same shall issue if the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied in the same
manner as for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and “…that a summons is sufficient to ensure the
person’s appearance…”; See warrants of arrest issued in the situations in Uganda, DRC, CAR, Sudan
and Libya; and summonses for the appearance of individuals in the situation in Kenya and Darfur,
Sudan.
39 Swart (supra) 1589.
40 See ICC Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning  the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004); See ICC Press Release, Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens Investigation into Northern Uganda (July 29, 2004).
41 See ICC Press Release, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (Apr. 19, 2004); See ICC Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004).
42 See ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-20050107-86, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the
Central African Republic (July 7, 2005); See ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-20070522-220, the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its Investigation in CAR (May 22, 2007).
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These four referrals have however not been devoid of controversy surrounding the
cooperation between these African governments and the Court. In the situation
concerning the DRC, it is widely perceived that following the issuing of warrants for
the arrest of five of its nationals, the DRC has not delivered all five suspects to the
Court despite having de facto and de jure control of the entire DRC.43 In the situation
concerning Uganda, the Court has issued five warrants for the arrest of the top
commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”).44
The Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (“UPDF”), which is the armed forces of the
Government of Uganda (“GoU”) was involved in sustained armed conflict with the
LRA in northern Uganda for a period of two decades from 1986. The LRA was driven
out of the territory of Uganda by the beginning of 2005 and into South Sudan. By this
time, the GoU was rendered incapable of enforcing the warrants of arrest for the five
suspects.  It was then that the negotiations for peace began in Juba between the GoU
and the LRA. Whereas the GoU was in close proximity to some of the LRA
commanders, the pre-conditions set for the peace negotiations included the non-
enforcement of the warrants of arrest while the commanders attended the talks. It was
later in the Juba Peace Talks that the LRA called for the revoking of the warrants of
arrest as a condition for the signing of the last document to seal the Juba Peace
Agreement. The Court did not revoke the warrants of arrest as demanded by the LRA,
forcing the immediate retreat of the LRA to the lawless Garamba National Park in
eastern DRC and an end to the Juba Peace Talks. There has also been hue and cry
43 There is an outstanding warrant for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, leader of a rebel group operating in
the east of the DRC. Reports by civil society indicate that the suspect resides in eastern DRC in plain
view of the authorities but continues to enjoy free movement.
44 The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has issued warrants for the arrest of Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti,
Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya (deceased). The four suspects are at large and
suspected to be in hiding in Garamba National Park in eastern DRC, the Central African Republic or in
South Sudan.
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about the atrocities committed against civilians in Northern Uganda by the UPDF.
None of these crimes have been investigated or prosecuted and there has been a fair
amount of criticism that the Court has turned a blind eye to these crimes committed by
the GoU.
Cooperation with the Court has proved to be very difficult in the two situations –
Sudan (Darfur) and Libya - where the Court’s jurisdiction has been triggered by a
referral by the UNSC in terms of Article 13(b) Rome Statute and acting under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. Both Sudan and Libya are non-States Parties to the Rome
Statute. There is little cooperation between these countries and the Court, with Sudan
periodically rejected the legitimacy of the Court and Libya claiming its ability to
conduct the trials of Saif Al Islam Gadhafi and Mohammed Al Senussi both of whom
have outstanding warrants of arrest from the Court. Since both situations in Libya and
Darfur are referrals made by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
one would expect that both Sudan and Libya should cooperate with the Court
following a Chapter VII decision to which they are bound.45 A similar obligation of
all Member States of the UN to cooperate with the UN ad hoc Tribunals – created by
decisions of the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in conformity
with Article 25 of the UN Charter.46
The involvement of the UNSC, a political body in the judicial and legal functions of
the Court was a matter that was debated at length by the negotiators of the Rome
Statute. Whereas prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute, the negotiators of this
45 Article 13 (b) Rome Statute; Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with the provisions relating to
exercise of powers by the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security where a threat
to the peace has occurred.
46 Article 25 UN Charter provides that “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”
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instrument were alive to the tensions between political and legal objectives of the
UNSC and the Court respectively, this tension was revived when the UNSC referred
the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Prosecutor of the Court and the issuing of
warrants of arrest by the Pre-Trial Chambers of the Court for the Sudanese President
Omar Al-Bashir and other high-ranking Sudanese government officials involved in
the peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan (“GoS”) and the Sudan
Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”). It was widely believed that
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity had taken place in the situation in
Darfur.  At the time, the African Union (“AU”) had given the mandate to a High
Level Panel on Darfur, which made recommendations on how peace, justice and
reconciliation could be addressed in Darfur. The AU subsequently endorsed these
recommendations and extended the mandate of the former South African President
Thabo Mbeki to chair the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan,
and negotiate the outstanding post-referendum issues between the National Congress
Party and SPLM. These negotiations were poised to usher peace to the troubled
situation in Darfur and South Sudan in general. As a result of the warrants of arrest,
the GoS pulled out of the peace process thereby negating the gains and efforts made
by the AU to restore and build peace in Sudan.
The relationship between the AU and the Court over the past seven years cannot be
described in any other terms but as a frosty one. The genesis of the tensions between
the two institutions stems from the timings of the arrest warrants in both the situations
in Uganda and in Sudan. The AU favoured a sequencing of interventions favouring
the peace processes in these two countries that were embroiled in decades of conflict,
while the Court remains interested in accountability of individuals who bear the
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greatest responsibility for the international crimes that have taken place in those two
countries. Consequently, the 13th AU Heads of States Summit held in Sirte, Libya
called for all African States Parties to the Rome Statute to desist from cooperating
with the Court or arresting the President of Sudan47 for the war crimes, crimes against
humanity48 and genocide49 with which he has been charged. The AU has reiterated
this decision at its 17th session, once again calling its members not to cooperate with
the Court50 after the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court issued warrants for the former
President of Libya Muammar Gadhafi (now deceased), his son Saif Al Islam Gadhafi
who served as de facto Prime Minister of Libya and Mohammed Al Senoussi who
served the Gadhafi regime as a high ranking military and security officer.
These AU decisions run contrary to the obligation of States Parties to the Rome
Statute to cooperate with the Court. All thirty-three African States Parties to the Rome
Statute have an obligation to arrest any person at large where an arrest warrant has
been issued by the Court. Some countries have made declarations in support of the
AU’s decisions51 while others have called upon the AU Member States to comply
47 “Decides that in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, the
AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of
the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.”
Para 10, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII)
48 Arrest warrant issued in 2009 relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity
49 Arrest warrant issued in 2010 relating to genocide
50 Decision of the 17th AU Heads of State and Government Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 15
July 2011 condemning the issuance of arrest warrants by the ICC for Muammar Mohammed Abu
Minyar Gaddafi and two other high-level Libyan officials. Participating states at the summit also
criticized the UNSC for not requesting the ICC to defer investigations and prosecutions in the situation
in Darfur, Sudan under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Such a request by the UNSC has the effect of
suspending the ICC arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir; See CICC Press
Release, African Union Maintains Contradictory Stance on Justice, (July 18, 2011)
51 See Chad says it will not execute ICC warrant against Libya’s Gaddafi, Sudan Tribune (May 19,
2011) “The Chadian government made it clear that it will not cooperate with the ICC in arresting three
Libyan officials named by the tribunal’s chief prosecutor…”
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with international law.52 Most recently the President of Malawi revoked the
government’s willingness to host the 2012 AU Summit on the grounds that they
would rather forfeit the opportunity to serve as host than to invite President Bashir of
Sudan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia is also on record in saying that
Bashir “will regret the day that he was born” should he set foot in Zambia.53
Whereas the African Union Summit decisions call for non-cooperation with the Court,
there is little traction on that debate by individual African States Parties to the Court.
Most of these States are committed to fulfilling their obligations to cooperate as
provided in the Rome Statute. Tladi posits that the AU decisions on non-cooperation
with the Court ‘raise questions about the direction of international law and
international law making from both a normative and institutional perspective’.54 An
institutional perspective relates to the relationship between institutions charged with
the responsibility to protect on various levels both regionally and internationally. In
this case, the AU has a regional mandate given to it by its Member States to protect
and promote the human rights in the continent. The Court is a treaty-based body
whose objective also includes the protection of the rights of individuals relating to the
52 Addressing African heads of State at the 15th AU Summit in Kampala, the Vice President of
Botswana said “Botswana cannot associate herself with any decision which calls upon her to disregard
her obligations to the International Criminal Court.” Available at
http://www.gov.bw/en/News/Botswana-stands-by-the-International-Criminal-Court-/ (accessed July 19,
2011); See Statement by the Botswana Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
following 17th AU Heads of State Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea calling African States Parties
to the Rome Statute not to cooperate with the ICC in effecting Gaddafi’s arrest warrant. “The
Government of Botswana pledges to continue to uphold basic human and political rights and hereby
calls on fellow members of the AU to support the ICC in carrying out its mandate to apprehend the
Libyan leader, as a critical step towards alleviating the plights of the Libyan people, and having the
way for a new democratic dispensation in that country.” Available at
http://www.mofaic.gov.bw/index.php (accessed July 19, 2011)
53 See “Zambia ready to arrest Al Bashir” which appeared in The Sunday Times of Malawi, available at
http://www.bnltimes.com/index.php/sunday-times/headlines/national/6528-zambia-ready-to-arrest-al-
bashir [Accessed 3/10/2012].
54 Tladi D, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of
international law” 34 South African Yearbook of International Law (2009), 57 -69, 57-58
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prosecution of international crimes. The AU views the Court as a neo-imperialist
institution despite sharing common objectives.
This ‘collision course’ between the AU and the Court Tladi argues is predicated on
the challenge of a new value-based international law in the form of the Court, that is
supposedly supported on mostly European values and pushed on non-Western
cultures in the name of universality.55 This supposition however cannot be true in the
sense that fighting a culture of impunity cannot be said to belong solely to European
values. The suppression of crimes and the fight against humanity is representative of
universal norms to which the AU and indeed Africans subscribes. Tladi suggests that
the discontent by the African political body rests squarely on the position that ‘the
dignity, sovereignty and integrity of the African continent’56 dictates that Africa itself
should mete out justice for crimes committed by Africans against Africans.57
Evidently few African criminal justice systems are equipped to investigate and
prosecute the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The capacity of these
African States should be built in order to address the impunity gap created when the
Court prosecutes a handful of cases in a given situation where gross violations of
human rights have taken place. Chapter II will discuss the concept of positive
complementarity as a possible solution to the AU and ICC impasse.
55 Tladi (supra), 64; See also Koskenniemi ‘International law in Europe: Between tradition and
renewal’ (2005) 16 European journal of International Law 113
56 AU Summit Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court 9ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec 245(XIII), July 2009, para. 12
57 Tladi, supra note 54, 67
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CHAPTER II
The Principle of Complementarity: Kenya’s challenge of cooperation
with the Court
3.3 Introduction
3.4 Background to the Situation in Kenya
3.5 Factual Basis for the Admissibility Challenge
3.6 Theoretical Understanding of Complementarity
2.4.1 Legal basis for complementarity
2.4.2 Exposition of Article 17 and the Court’s interpretation of
complementarity in the Kenyan situation
2.4.3 Unwillingness or inability
3.7 A place for positive complementarity in Kenya
3.8 Concluding remarks
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The preamble of the Rome Statute affirms that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at a national level and by
enhancing international cooperation’.58 It further emphasizes that ‘the International
Criminal Court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.’59 Article 1
Rome Statute provides that the Court ‘…shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.’ This is the basis of the principle of complementarity, which has been
58 Para 4 of the preamble of the Rome Statute supra note 1.
59 Para 10 of the preamble of the Rome Statute supra note 1.
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coined from an epistemological concept in atomic physics60 and upon which the Court
is to determine the admissibility of a case.61
The complementary character of the Court reflects the intentions of the drafters of the
Rome Statute that the Court aims at promoting the effectiveness of and not replaces
national mechanisms.62 States Parties with jurisdiction over international crimes are
not automatically precluded from exercising exclusive jurisdiction merely because the
Court has been seized of a matter. Both ad hoc Tribunals established by the UNSC,
conversely have primacy of jurisdiction over national criminal jurisdictions.63
Primacy of jurisdiction means that: (i) the exercise of jurisdiction by the ad hoc
Tribunals prevents any investigation or prosecution at the national level;64 (ii) the ad
hoc Tribunals may formally ask national jurisdictions to defer cases to them at any
time before the issue of a final judgment at national level; and (iii) the ad hoc
Tribunals may exercise their jurisdiction even after final judgment has been delivered
60 The origin of complementarity as an epistemological concept is atomic physics. It denotes that two
descriptions, though incompatible because they describe mutually exclusive observations, are both
indispensable and together necessary for an exhaustive description because the conditions of
observation influence the object under investigation. Such a conceptualisation of complementarity is
intrinsically linked to the name Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist, who initially developed the notion in
response to the epistemological difficulties in understanding the nature of light. As some experiments
showed light to be particles while others showed that it behaved like waves, Bohr asserted that these
two descriptions, although incompatible because mutually exclusive, are ‘complementary’ in order to
describe the nature of light exhaustively. In his words, the two descriptions ‘represent equally essential
knowledge about atomic systems and together exhaust this knowledge’. N. Bohr, Atomic Physics and
Human Knowledge (New York, Wiley 1958) 74. In Bohr’s view, not only practical considerations lead
to such a conclusion, but also the fact that the conditions of observation, such as an experimental
device, in atomic physics influence the object under investigation. The significance of Bohr’s assertion
was not confined to atomic physics, however, but was subsequently considered by him as a means to
clarify epistemological problems in other sciences, including biology, psychology and philosophy and
taken up by others in these and other fields. For an overview, see E. Rasmussen, Complementarity and
Political Science (Odense, University Press of Southern Denmark 1987) 4 – 12.
61 Admissibility of cases before the Court is governed by Article 17 Rome Statute supra note 1.
62 Hector Olasolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court, (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 121.
63 The curtains are closing on the ICTY and ICTR (“ad hoc Tribunals”) as their extended mandates are
expiring. The ensuing argument is premised on the nature of the primacy of jurisdiction of the ad hoc
tribunals over national criminal jurisdictions at the times that the ad hoc tribunals were established and
operated. At present the ad hoc tribunals are considering the transfer of cases to national criminal
jurisdictions.
64 Seguin, J. “Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the
Rome Statute”, 18 Boston University International Law Journal (2000), 99-100.
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by national courts if the latter have characterized the crimes as ordinary crimes or
national proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently
prosecuted.65
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, the Court is a permanent institution and its relationship
with national criminal jurisdictions does not assert primacy of jurisdiction, but rather
on the above mentioned complementarity. The regime established by the Rome
Statute is such that a State’s competence to try international crimes remains
untouched.66 According to the complementarity principle, trials concerning crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court remain the primary responsibility of States.
The complementarity approach mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Preamble and in
Article 1 is novel in international criminal justice in that states have the primacy of
criminal jurisdiction.  When understood in this sense, it is easy to see how the
Plenipotentiaries at the Rome conference viewed complementarity as a basis of
incentive for States to ratify the Rome Statute in that it represents a complete shift
from the precedence of the two ad hoc Tribunals, which have primacy of jurisdiction
over any state. However, the complementary nature of Court and national jurisdictions
is hinged on the willingness and ability of a state to exercise jurisdiction over its own
nationals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
65 Article 9 (2) ICTR Statute, supra note 3 and Article 10 (2) ICTY Statute, supra note 3.
66 Aravena, C.C., “The Admissibility Test before the International Criminal Court under Special
Consideration of Amnesties and Truth Commissions” in Jann K. Kleffner and Gerben Kor (eds.),
Complementary views on Complementarity: Proceedings of the international roundtable on the
complementary nature of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004),
115.
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This chapter discusses the situation in Kenya before the Court and specifically
analyses the test of the complementarity principle through Kenya’s admissibility
challenge at the Court. Kenya’s underlying argument in challenging the admissibility
of cases before the Court is based on assertions of its sovereignty.
2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE SITUATION IN KENYA
Kenya’s fate as a country in transition was sealed when violence erupted following
the publication of the results of highly contested presidential elections at the end of
2007. While the country had characteristically experienced violence during past
election periods, the violence then was sporadic and took place mainly prior to the
election date. The 2007 elections were markedly different. They were marred by
violence shortly after the announcement of the presidential results by the now defunct
Elections Commission of Kenya. The violence that broke out in various parts of the
country left over 1,300 people dead and over 600,000 others internally displaced.
Under the Chairmanship of H.E. Kofi Annan of the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities representatives of the two political parties Party of National Unity
(“PNU”) and Orange Democratic Movement (“ODM”), their leaders (the two
Principals), signed the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 that paved the
way for a Grand Coalition Government (“GCG”) headed by the two Principals, Mr.
Mwai Kibaki and Mr. Raila Odinga as the President and Prime Minister of the
Republic of Kenya respectively.
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The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (“KNDR”) initiative that was
established by the two Principles agreed on a reform agenda, which included
undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reform, and addressing
accountability and impunity. Three commissions were initially established: (i)
Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (“CIPEV”); (ii) Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); and (iii) Independent Interim Elections
Commission. CIPEV, which was established in May 2008 under The Commissions of
Inquiry Act, Cap 102 of the Laws of Kenya, is the most relevant of the three
Commissions to consider in this paper as it was mandated to ‘investigate the facts
surrounding circumstances related to acts of violence that followed the 2007
Presidential Elections’ and thereafter make recommendations within three months of
its formation.67 After receiving a 30-day extension68 of its mandate, CIPEV delivered
a report in October 2008 containing recommendations for inter alia the establishment
of a Special Tribunal for Kenya that met international standards to try persons accused
of committing crimes related to the post-election violence in Kenya.69 Failing to abide
by the recommendations of CIPEV, the two Principals committed to referring the
situation to the Court in terms of Article 13 (a) Rome Statute.70 Kenya signed the
Court Statute on 11 August 199 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 15
67 CIPEV created under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, Cap 102 Laws of Kenya on 22 May 2008 by
Kenya Gazette Notice No. 4473 and 4474 of 23 May 2008.
68 Extension of Time Kenya Gazette Notice No. 8661 of 11 September 2008.
69 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya, Government of
Kenya Printers, October 2008 pp. 453-476.
70 Chapter 5, paragraph 5 of the CIPEV Report reads:
“If either an agreement for the establishment of the Special Tribunal is not signed, or the
Statute for the Special Tribunal fails to be enacted, or the Special Tribunal fails to commence
functioning as contemplated above, or having commenced operating its purposes are
subverted, a list containing names of and relevant information on those suspected to bear the
greatest responsibility for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the proposed Special
Tribunal shall be forwarded to the Special Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The
Special Prosecutor shall be requested to analyze the seriousness of the information received
with a view to proceeding with an investigation and prosecuting such suspected persons.”
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March 2005.71 As Kenya is a State Party to the Rome Statute, the Court has
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in the
territory of Kenya after the entry into force of the Rome Statute in Kenya.72
In December 2010, the Court’s Prosecutor filed an application to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for summonses to appear for six individuals suspected of bearing
responsibility for crimes against humanity alleged to have been committed during the
post-election violence of 2008 in Kenya.73 The six are: Francis Kirimi Muthaura
(former Head of Public Service, Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the
National Security Advisory Committee), Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Deputy Prime
Minister, son of the Kenya’s first President and 2013 presidential aspirant),
Mohammed Hussein Ali (former Police Commissioner), William Samoei Ruto
(former Minister for Education and 2013 presidential aspirant), Henry Kiprono
Kosgey (former Minister for Industrialization) and Joshua Arap Sang (a radio
broadcaster).74 On 8 March 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued summonses to
appear for the six Kenyan citizens on the basis that there was evidence pointing to the
fact that these six individuals.75
71 Kenya: Signature and ratification and implementation status. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/Kenya.htm (accessed 28 March 2011).
72 See Articles 11 (2) and 12 (2) of the Rome Statute, supra note 1.
73 Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey
and Joshua Arap Sang, No.: ICC‐01/09 of 15 December 2010, Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang
(ICC-01/09-01/11-307) and Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis Muthaura,
Uhuru Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, No.: ICC‐01/09 of 15 December 2010, Prosecutor v
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01.09-02/11-274)
74 The first three are aligned to President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) and the last
three are aligned to Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).
75 Decision of Pre Trial Chamber II on Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, No.: ICC‐01/09 of 8 March 2011,
Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-307) and Decision of Pre Trial Chamber II on
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta and
Mohammed Hussein Ali of 8 March 2011, Prosecutor v Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01.09-
02/11-274)
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The six Kenyans first appeared before the Pre-Trial Chamber II in February 2011.
Following this appearance, the Government of Kenya submitted applications first to
the Pre-Trial Chamber expressing its ability and willingness to handle the post-
election violence on its own. The Pre-Trial Chamber II decided against this
admissibility challenge and the decision was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.
These decisions based on the Court’s interpretation of the principle of
complementarity laid out in the Rome Statute, forms the basis of this Chapter.
2.3 FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY CHALLENGE
The Government of Kenya filed an application on 31 March 2011 pursuant to Article
19 (2) (b) and Article 17 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute. This was based on Kenya being
the State which has jurisdiction over the post-election violence in the situation in
Kenya and the two cases currently before the Court concerning the conduct of Kenyan
citizens.76 The Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya
Pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome Statute (Application under Article 19) is premised
on what the government states are “fundamental and far reaching constitutional and
judicial reforms very recently enacted in Kenya.”77 Kenya argues that the Constitution
of Kenya Act (new Constitution) promulgated in August 2010 provides for a “Bill of
Rights which significantly strengthens fair trial rights and procedural guarantees
within the Kenyan criminal justice system”, “...a comprehensive range of judicial
reforms which fundamentally transform the administration of justice in Kenya”
76 Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC
Statute, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Cases of Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry
Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang and Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 31 March 2011 (Application under Article 19)
77 Id, para 2
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including “...national courts [that] will now be capable of trying crimes from the post-
election violence, including the ICC cases,” and “guarantees the independence of the
State’s investigative organs and ushers in wide-ranging reforms to the police
services.”78 On this basis, the Government of Kenya submitted that the two cases
before the Court are inadmissible.
Kenya asserted that it had cooperated with the Court at every instance including with
the then Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, who visited the country on several occasions
prior to his initiation of investigations concerning the post-election violence. Kenya
finds that owing to its respect and cooperation with the Court, it should not be treated
as an unwilling and non-cooperative state. More forcefully, Kenya rejects any idea
that the Court has primacy over national criminal systems. The Government of Kenya
recognizes that there have been national and international criticisms over its judicial
and investigative bodies. It however mentions that it is information from these very
institutions that have guided Prosecutor’s investigations.
To understand Kenya’s position, it is important to consider the main arguments in the
Application under Article 19. First, Article 17 of the Rome Statute reflects the need to
respect the sovereignty and integrity of national criminal justice systems and the
Court needs to take this into consideration when determining the admissibility of a
case.79 Where investigations or prosecutions are underway in a State, there should be
a presumption of inadmissibility of a case.80
78 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 2
79 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 27
80 Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Edited by O. Triffterer), 2nd
Ed., p. 616.
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Second, the Government of Kenya argues that there is no definition of
“unwillingness” in the Rome Statute and that there is no sign of “unwillingness” on
the part of Kenya as none of the grounds in Article 17 (2) are applicable to Kenya.81
Be that as it may, reading Article 17 of the Rome Statute, there are two alternatives in
paragraph (1) combined with exceptions. A case is inadmissible before the Court
unless the investigation or prosecution by a State with jurisdiction is not affected by
“unwillingness” or “inability”. To determine these exceptions, paragraphs (3) and (4)
provide guidance. From the wording in these two paragraphs (3) and (4), it appears
that the drafters were clear in dealing with the inquiries as to unwillingness and
inability on the part of a state to genuinely investigate and prosecute relative to an
ongoing case. In a sense, the complementary nature of the Court is brought to
existence when a case is the subject of a national criminal jurisdiction. The question
of unwillingness and inability can therefore only be interrogated in the context of
existing cases at the national level, failing which the inquiry may be redundant. The
Application under Article 19 however sheds light to the limited jurisprudence by the
Court concerning admissibility challenges, particularly pronouncements by the Court
on investigations or prosecutions at “the time of the proceedings”.82
81 Article 17 (2) Rome Statute supra note 1 reads:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more
of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings in which the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
82 The Government of Kenya Application, para 19 where the authority Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui,
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II
of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, 25 September 2009, paras
78-80. The Government of Kenya argues that the relevant period for the Pre-Trial Chamber to consider
when determining the capacity of the Kenya criminal justice system to deal with the post-election
violence cases is the entire reform process ongoing in the country, and not only the information
available at the time of filing of the Government of Kenya Application.
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Third, within the reforms of the investigative processes, the new Constitutional Office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is established, “independent of
Government with all the necessary safeguards to guarantee independence of
investigations and prosecutions at all levels.”83 The Application under Article 19
stated that the appointment of the DPP of Kenya would have been concluded by end
of May 2011 and investigation of all cases including those presently before the Court
would have commenced. In the interim, a Directorate of Criminal Investigations had
already undertaken preliminary investigations in Kenya and further investigations on
post-election violence related cases are being conducted in seven of Kenya’s eight
provinces to lay a basis for local trials.84 Kenya stated that by the end of July 2011, a
detailed investigation report will be available to the Court concerning post-election
violence related cases, including those presently before the Court.85
Kenya rebutted claims that its own investigations concerning post-election violence
related cases had only been for low-level perpetrators thus excluding the senior-level
perpetrators from the ODM and PNU political parties.86 Kenya argued that “[m]any
international courts have used a “bottom up” approach in investigating the most
serious violations, it being very difficult to start an investigation at the highest levels
without a sound knowledge of underlying crimes.”87 Furthermore Kenya argued that
since the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of
an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31, March 2010
83 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 67.
84 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, paras 69- 70.
85 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, paras 71- 74.
86 Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31, March 2010 (Decision Authorizing Investigation in Kenya),
paras. 182- 187.
87 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 34 and 71.
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(Decision Authorizing Investigation in Kenya), “...significant developments... [i]n
particular, the adoption of the new Constitution in August 2010 and associated
reforms has meant that Kenya is able to conduct national criminal proceedings for all
crimes arising from the post-election violence.”88Essentially, it is subtly conceded that
when the Pre-Trial Chamber was considering the application by the Prosecutor to
initiate investigations into the situation in Kenya pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute, there were glaring inadequacies in the Kenyan criminal justice system to deal
with post-election violence related cases.89
While the Application under Article 19 points to the establishment of the necessary
reforms to facilitate investigations and try all cases arising from the post-election
violence, there is concern that the Application under Article 19 “contains empty
promises which cannot be used to pre-empt the Court’s jurisdiction.”90 The Rome
Statute provides four instances where the Court shall determine that a case before it is
inadmissible: where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it; where the case has been investigated by a State with jurisdiction
and that State decides not to prosecute; the person has already been tried for conduct
which is the subject of the complaint; or the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court.91 The contention is that none of the four conditions have
been met in the two cases concerning the situation in Kenya to merit a finding of
inadmissibility. From the reading of Article 17 (1) of the Rome Statute, it may not be
sufficient for the Government of Kenya to state that it is embarking on investigations
88 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 34.
89 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 36.
90 Amnesty International Public Statement “Kenya’s Application Before the International Criminal
Court: A Promise is Not Enough to Pre-empt the Court’s Jurisdiction” 06 April 2011, AI Index: AFR
32/003/2011
91 Article 17 (1) (a) to (d) Rome Statute supra note 1.
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based on the reform processes in the country for the two cases to be considered
inadmissible, particularly in light of the fact that there have not been successful steps
to establish a credible national judicial process to try the six individuals let alone other
Kenyan citizens who committed crimes and human rights abuses during the post-
election violence. The issue is further compounded by the fact that the failure to set up
a local judicial process led the Prosecutor to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate
investigations in Kenya. Upon receiving authorization to investigate, the Prosecutor
has since completed investigations, obtained summonses to appear and is ready to
prosecute if the charges against the six individuals are confirmed.
Fifth, Kenya argues that there are substantial reforms in the judiciary including the
appointment of a new Chief Justice, the establishment of a Judicial Service
Commission, to “promote and facilitate the independence and accountability of the
judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent administration of justice”92 In
essence Kenya argues that its judiciary, although lacking in some areas, is currently
receiving due attention from the Executive and Legislature through the enactment of
laws to provide for a judicial system that would adequately address the post-election
violence cases.93 Du Plessis and Gevers note that Kenya has one of the best developed
judiciaries in Africa. It is also one of the few African countries to have domestically
implemented the Rome Statute, and the resulting legislation is impressive and
progressive.94 In essence, the Government of Kenya is requesting the Pre-Trial
92 Constitution of Kenya, Articles 171-172.
93 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, paras 47 -66.
94 Max Du Plessis and Chris Gevers, International Justice: Kenyan case a good test of an ICC founding
principle, Business Day, 28 January 2011.
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Chamber to consider the entire reform process in Kenya “as a whole and not merely
the date on which the application is first filed”.95
2.4 THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF COMPLEMENTARITY
What then is the place of the principle of complementarity in the prosecution of the
core international crimes? Article 17 of the Rome Statute suggests that the Court’s
ultima ratio jurisdiction will only come into action when a State is unable or
unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute persons alleged to have committed
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The default position remains that
when these core international crimes take place in a given territory, States with
jurisdiction (based either on ‘active personality’ or ‘passive personality’) have the
primary responsibility to conduct investigations and prosecutions. The relationship
between the Court and national criminal jurisdictions is therefore based on the formal
primacy of jurisdiction of the latter. The Court is established by treaty and its
jurisdiction is conferred upon it by the consent of States Parties to the Rome Statute.
In essence State Parties declare an intention to delegate their criminal jurisdiction to
the Court under certain conditions. Arguably then, the principle of complementarity
imports the sovereignty of States Parties to the Rome Statute in so far as the
determination of jurisdiction and concomitantly the admissibility of cases.
Complementarity as a defining characteristic of the Court does raise the question of
sovereignty of States. Mégret observes that on the one hand, it represents a minimal
recognition of the legitimacy of State sovereignty. As a presumption in favour of
national criminal jurisdiction, complementarity is an implicit, normative and
95 Application under Article 19 supra note 76, para 19.
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substantive preference for the work of national jurisdictions in dealing with
international crimes. On the other hand, complementarity is also a potent threat to
State sovereignty. The price of the international community’s recognition of the
priority of national criminal jurisdictions is that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction
only if that priority is not put to good use.96
The Court is, and has always been, promoted as an institution whose fundamental
objective is to become universal. Mégret observes that an ICC without States Parties
would be non-existent; an ICC with few and marginal States Parties would be
irrelevant.97 Moreover, there is a system of checks and balances in the Rome Statute
on the Court’s delegated authority. An exposition of the relevant Rome Statute
provisions is necessary to illustrate the uniqueness of the principle of
complementarity.
2.4.1 Legal basis for complementarity
The point of departure is that the admissibility of each case before the Court is
presumed.98 Article 17 stipulates that a case is inadmissible where certain criteria
listed are met. The default rule in the absence of those criteria being satisfied is
admissibility.99 Aravena and Robinson disapprove of the simplistic appreciation of the
complementarity test where it is understood that Article 17 suggests that a case is
96 Mégret F., “Why would states want to join the ICC? A theoretical exploration based on the legal
nature of complementarity.” in Jann K. Kleffner and Gerben Kor (eds.), Complementary views on
Complementarity: Proceedings of the international roundtable on the complementary nature of the
International Criminal Court (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004), 2.
97Mégret, supra note 96, 4.
98 Aravena C.C., supra note 66, 116.
99 Darryl Robinson, “Comments on Chapter 4” in Jann K. Kleffner and Gerben Kor (eds.),
Complementary views on Complementarity: Proceedings of the international roundtable on the
complementary nature of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004),141
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admissible before the Court where a State with jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to
genuinely prosecute persons alleged to have committed the core international crimes.
Rather the ‘unwilling and unable’ test only comes into question when evaluating the
genuineness of an existing national criminal procedure.100 This distinction is
particularly important in will be re-visited in the coming sections where the situation
in Kenya is analyzed.
2.4.2 Exposition of Article 17 and the Court’s interpretation of
complementarity in the Kenyan situation
Article 17(1) (a) requires the existence of either of two national processes for a case to
be found inadmissible; an investigation or a prosecution. Furthermore, the
investigation or prosecution must be conducted by a State which has jurisdiction over
the crimes committed.101These requirements must exist simultaneously. An
investigation is a systematic inquiry about the facts of a crime and about participation
in it, while a prosecution is the opening and undertaking of a judicial criminal
process.102 The Appeals Chamber decisions of August 30, 2011 relating to the
admissibility challenge by the Government of Kenya of the Kenyan cases before the
Court elaborate on the principle of complementarity in support of the Rome Statute
100 Daryl Robinson supra note 99, 142
101 Jurisdiction of a State is determined either by: the accused being a national of the State; the crime
occurring within the State’s territory (territorial jurisdiction); or based on extradition treaties between
States on the basis of universal jurisdiction. The duty of all states to prosecute individuals alleged to
have committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is an obligation erga omnes
[Barcelona Traction case, [(Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase)] ICJ Rep 1970 3 at paragraph 33]. As
such following from the universal jurisdiction theory, it is possible that investigations or prosecutions
are or have been conducted by another state under the universality principle other than the prosecuting
state.
102 Aravena supra note 66, 117.
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provisions.103 These decisions suggest that the test taken by the Court to determine the
admissibility of cases before it is first that whether there are national proceedings in
the State with jurisdiction. Only if there are existing proceedings does the Court then
investigate whether the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out
investigations and prosecutions in terms of Article 17 of the Rome Statute.104 The
Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case
lays the foundation for judicial precedence that “the initial questions to ask are (1)
whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions or (2) whether there have
been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned.”105 The jurisdiction of the Court in the situation
concerning the DRC was triggered by a State referral under Article 14 of the Rome
Statute. It is clear in such cases of self-referral that the State is willing to cooperate
with the Court on the crimes committed in that country. In Kenya however, although
the government demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the Court following
negotiations between its officials and the Prosecutor, Kenya was not prepared to cede
jurisdiction to the Court for these particular cases. The Appeals Chamber Decisions of
30 August 2011 conclusively asserts that the first stage of the admissibility test, being
whether national proceedings are or have taken place, remains regardless of the
103 Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber II
of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘ Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19 (2) (b) of the Statute’, Prosecutor v Muthaura,
Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01.09-02/11-274), Appeals Chamber (30 August 2011) (hereafter ‘Appeals
Chamber Decision of 30 August, 2011, Case I’) and  Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of
Kenya against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘ Decision on the
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to
Article 19 (2) (b) of the Statute’, Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-307) Appeals
Chamber (30 August 2011) (hereafter ‘Appeals Chamber Decision of 30 August 2011, Case II’)
104 AC Decision of 30 August 2011, Case I and II, paras. 40 and 41 respectively
105 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of
12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8), Appeals Chamber (25 September 2009) para. 78.
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trigger mechanism of the Court’s jurisdiction in a situation that it is seized of. In
relevant portion the Appeals Chamber Decision says:
It should be underlined...that determining the existence of an investigation
must be distinguished from assessing whether the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution, which is the second
question to consider when determining the admissibility of a case. For
assessing whether the State is indeed investigating the genuineness of the
investigation is not at issue; what is at issue is whether there are investigative
steps.106
Under Article 17(1)(b), a past investigation or prosecution disqualifies a case for trial
before the Court, where a systematic inquiry into the facts of and participation in these
crimes has taken place, and further where the State has decided not to prosecute the
case. According to Article 17(1) (c), a case is inadmissible under the ne bis in idem
principle.107 Finally, Article 17(1) (d), a case is inadmissible if it ‘is not of sufficient
gravity to justify further action by the Court.’ This is an objective criterion as it is
based on the case itself and not on the existence or nature of a national action
concerning it. This is perhaps why this criterion does not have any exception unlike
the other criteria listed in Article 17. Following from the objectivity of this criterion,
one must reject the opinion that the mere fact that cases are being or have been
investigated by a truth commission makes them fall under the ground of
106 Appeals Chamber Decision of 30 August 2011 Case I and II, paras. 40 and 41 respectively.
107 Article 20 of the Rome Statute, supra note 1, espouses the ne bis in idem principle and provides that
no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for
which the person has been convicted or acquitted. For the purposes of the admissibility test under
Article 17, this applies to trials conducted at the State level.
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inadmissibility in Article 17(1)(d), as a consequence of the fact that truth commissions
would partially fulfil the goals of criminal prosecution.108
Where a State that is challenging the admissibility of cases before the Court, that State
must show that investigative steps or prosecutions are underway and not merely assert
that there are plans towards investigations or prosecutions.
The earlier decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber II relating to the admissibility
challenge was clear that for an admissibility challenge to succeed, investigations at the
national level concerning the same suspects must be ongoing, as opposed to some
future investigations as submitted by the government of Kenya.109 The Pre-Trial
Chamber concluded that it was insufficient for a state with jurisdiction to claim
ongoing investigations, unless concrete evidence of such investigations is brought
before the Court. The Pre-Trial Chamber was less convinced of future investigations
regardless of “fundamental and far-reaching constitutional and judicial
reforms...enacted in Kenya.”110 Further that it required “current investigative steps
undertaken.”111 The Appeals Chamber set the burden on the state to show that cases
are inadmissible112:
108 Aravena supra note 66, 119.
109 International Criminal Court, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging
the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, Prosecutor v Muthaura,
Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-96), Pre-Trial Chamber II (May 30, 2011) (hereafter ‘PTC II
Decision of 30 May 2011, Case I’), para. 59 and International Criminal Court, Decision on the
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-02/11-96), Pre-Trial
Chamber II (May 30, 2011) (hereafter ‘PTC II Decision of 30 May 2011, Case II’), para. 63
110 International Criminal Court, Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya
Pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome Statute, Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-01/11-19),
Pre-Trial Chamber II (31 March 2011) para 2 (hereafter ‘Kenya’s Admissibility Challenge of 31
March 2011)
111 Pre-Trial Chamber Decision of 30 May 2011 Case I and Case II, paras. 60 and 64 respectively.
112 Appeals Chamber Decision of 30 May 2011 Case I and Case II, paras. 61 and 62 respectively.
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to discharge this burden the State must provide the Court with evidence
of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value that
demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the case. It is not sufficient
merely to assert that investigations are ongoing.
Even where a State challenging the admissibility of cases before the Court can
demonstrate that investigative steps or prosecutions related to crimes within the
Court’s jurisdiction are proceeding locally, the Appeals Chamber found that the local
investigations or prosecutions must be of the same individuals before the Court and
for the same conduct that the Court investigations and prosecutions relate. This judge-
made criteria of the admissibility test knocks the wind off Kenya’s sail.
Article 17(1) (a) of the Rome Statute does not elaborate on the nature of ongoing
national proceedings. The decisions of the Court in the Kenya cases provide direction
on what these national proceedings should look like.  The first point to note on this
from the Appeals Chamber decisions of 30 May 2011 is that there is a distinction
between the admissibility at the preliminary stages of a situation, in which Articles 15
and 18 of the Rome Statute relate and admissibility of cases under Article 19 where a
suspect or a state with jurisdiction lodges a challenge relating to a case.113 An
admissibility challenge in a case requires a higher undertaking on the part of the
suspect or state with jurisdiction. In this situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber was not
satisfied with Kenya’s submission that it was going to investigate “persons at the
same level in the hierarchy”114 for the same overall conduct or type of crimes that the
113 Appeals Chamber Decisions of 30 May 2011 Cases I and II, paras 37 and 38 respectively.
114 Kenya’s Admissibility Challenge of 31 March 2011, supra note 100, para 32
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Court was investigating.115 The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Pre-Trial Chamber
noting that “the national investigation must cover the same individual and
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court” in
connection to an application filed under Article 19.116
In issuing a warrant of arrest in the case Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, the Pre-Trial
Chamber held that a determination of inadmissibility of a case requires that “national
proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the
case before the Court.117
In summary therefore, according to Article 1 Rome Statute, the Court is
‘complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’. Consequently, under article 17 (1)
(a) of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible before the Court where it is the subject
of an investigation or prosecution by a State with jurisdiction unless the State
concerned is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution. If the case has already been investigated and a decision not to prosecute
has been made, the case is only admissible if the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to prosecute. In addition a case is
admissible where the person concerned has already been tried for conduct that is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under the statute’s
double jeopardy provisions.
2.4.3 Unwillingness or inability
115 Pre-Trial Chamber Decisions of 30 May 2011 in Cases I and II, paras. 50 and 54 respectively.
116 Appeals Chamber Decisions of 30 August 2011 in Cases I and II paras. 39 and 40 respectively.
117 International Criminal Court, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest.
Article 58, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber 1
(10 February 2006).
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In assessing the unwillingness of a State to carry out a genuine investigation or
prosecution, the Court will consider whether: the relevant proceedings or national
decision were designed to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; there has been an unjustified delay in the
proceedings which, under the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice; and the proceedings were not or are not being conducted
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner
which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice. These considerations are taken with regard to due process
recognized by international law.118
In order to determine inability, the Court considers whether due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State in
question is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.119
Even where the Prosecutor has determined that a case is admissible based on the
exclusion of a State’s unwillingness or inability as per Article 17, an investigation into
any situation by the Prosecutor can only be initiated after the requirements of Article
53 have been met. There may have been an incorrect or partially incorrect
understanding of the complementarity, where it was sufficient to theorize that the
jurisdiction of the Court is activated where a state is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigations or prosecutions. El Zeidy and Broomhall suggest that
118 Article 17(2) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
119 Article 17(3) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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where crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have taken place in a State and the
State fails to act, the inaction is sufficient grounds for the admissibility of cases at the
Court.120
2.5 A place for positive complementarity in Kenya and Concluding Remarks
Complementarity at the Court is certainly solidifying in terms of its interpretation
from the Rome Statute provisions. Before the complementarity mould sets, certain
concerns of the international community, particularly in the situation countries of the
ICC must be addressed in order for the objective of the Court – to combat impunity -
to succeed. Positive complementarity addresses these concerns and most importantly
supports local ownership of states in the fight against impunity for international
crimes. Though not an elegant term, the expression found great support in the stock-
taking process on complementarity at the Review of the Rome Statute Conference
held in Kampala in 2010. The notion of positive complementarity extends the
cooperation among States to include support of national judicial and penal
institutions. The object of positive complementarity is the strengthening of national
jurisdictions to carry out effective investigations and prosecutions of the core
international crimes. Unlike the other states, which Mégret refers to as quasi-virtuous
or almost virtuous121, some states recognize that their legal systems would not
120 See Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law 161, 221,
230 (2008); Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court:
International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7 Max Plank
Yearbook of United Nations Law 591, at 601; See also Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the
International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law 91 (2003); Nidal Jurdi, Some
Lessons on Complementarity for the International Criminal Court Review Conference, 34 South
African Yearbook of International Law 28, 29-30 (2009)
121 Mégret supra note 96, defines ‘Quasi-virtuous’ States or ‘almost virtuous’ States as States which
can conceive that their nationals might commit international crimes but who cannot conceive that they
would not want to try them.
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effectively prosecute international crimes committed by their nationals, but are
nevertheless committed to the long-term goal of the fight against impunity.
At the Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in Kampala in May-June 2010 by
the Assembly of State Parties (ASP), South Africa and Denmark were jointly
responsible for the stock-taking process on complementarity. It is at this stock-taking
exercise by the ASP that the concept of ‘positive complementarity’ emerged. The duty
of States to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes in its territory emanates from a long-standing principle in international
law.122 This duty is especially burdensome where a State’s judicial system faces
several handicaps that prevent it from effectively investigating and prosecuting these
international crimes. There is another limitation of investigations and prosecutions at
the international level. The Court cannot investigate and prosecute every person
accused of committing the crimes within its jurisdiction. In fact, the Court can only
prosecute a handful of people who in the opinion of the Prosecutor are the ‘most
responsible for the most serious crimes, based on evidence’.123 A State’s obligation to
ensure that justice is carried out in its territory for those affected by the crimes is not
dispensed with after the Court has taken over investigations and prosecutions. At the
domestic level, there are many more perpetrators of crimes who must face the justice
system.
This is where the concept of ‘positive complementarity’ finds its basis. There is a
need to strengthen the national systems of State Parties to be able to handle the
122 Also articulated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, supra note 1.
123 The Office of the Prosecutor’s experience in respecting complementarity, Statement by Mrs. Fatou
Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect of the ICC at the ICC Pacific Outreach Roundtable in Sydney, Australia 16
Feb 2012 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/298482DC-8E27-415E-97C6-
EEA930837EB9/0/StatementSidneycomplementarity.pdf [Accessed 12 May 2012]
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numerous cases that cannot, for logistical and other reasons, be handled at the
international level.
As stated above, Article 17 of the Rome Statute recognizes the sovereignty of States
to deal with serious crimes of international concern. The notion of positive
complementarity came about during the negotiation concerning the Rome Statute.
States recognized that in addition to the integral role of the principle of
complementarity in the effective functioning of the Rome Statute system, states may
assist each other towards ensuring that the national criminal jurisdictions are capable
of handling the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction. This is evidenced in a
resolution adopted at the ICC Review Conference in Kampala, where the Assembly of
States Parties recognized “the desirability for States Parties to assist each other in
strengthening domestic capacity to ensure that investigations and prosecutions of
serious crimes of international concern can take place at the national level.”124 The
Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on positive complementarity is aimed at
‘encouraging genuine national proceedings where possible, including in situation
countries, relying on its various networks of cooperation, but without involving the
Office directly in capacity building or financial and technical assistance’.125 The
Report of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties refers to positive
complementarity as:126
“[A]ll activities/actions whereby national jurisdictions are strengthened
and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of
124 Resolution RC/Res.1, adopted at the 9th Plenary meeting of the Assembly of States Parties,
Kampala, 8 June 2010.
125 ICC Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 – 2012, 1 February 2010, para 17 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-
D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf [Accessed 28 March 2011].
126 Report of the Bureau on stocktaking: Complementarity, para 16 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8R/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf [Accessed 28 March 2011].
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crimes included in the Rome Statute, without involving the Court in
capacity building, financial support and technical assistance, but
instead leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist each
other on a voluntary basis.”
Within the ambit of positive complementarity, the focus of investigations and
prosecutions should shift from the four Kenyans whose criminal charges were
confirmed in January 2012 to the scores of other individuals who need to be brought
to account for their role in the post-2007 election violence.127 There is sufficient
evidence to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed in Kenya and
following from the CIPEV recommendations and reports from civil society
organizations operating in Kenya, there is an outcry for justice at the local level.
These crimes need to be investigated and persons who committed these crimes tried
by Kenyan criminal courts – whether hybrid or special tribunal meeting international
standards or the High Court of Kenya empowered by the International Crimes Act of
2008.
A report submitted by a Government Working Committee on the ICC, established
following the confirmation of charges decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to advise the
government on the implications of the decision reports that “provisions set out in
Article 50 (2) (n) of the Constitution…could permit Kenya to have jurisdiction in
respect of crimes under international law at the time of the PEG.”128 The Working
Committee on the ICC recommends the appointment of an independent Special
127 There have been efforts in the media to shift the focus from the Kenyan ICC suspects “Plea to Give
Ocampo Six a Black Out, Daily Nation”,
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/Plea+to+give+Ocampo+Six+a+blackout+/-/1292/1143482/-/format/xhtml/-
/k4m6q2/-/index.html [Accessed on 7 April 2011]
128 Report of the Working Committee on the International Criminal Court, paras 70-8, 70
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Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes related to the post-election violence in
Kenya without the necessity of establishing special courts or chambers in Kenya.129 A
more sustainable role for the Special Prosecutor, other than to investigate and
prosecute the four Kenyan accused persons before the Court, is for this office to
investigate and prosecute other individuals responsible for the post-2007 election
violence.
129 Id, para 79-85, 79 and 82.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter commences with a section reflecting on the rights of an accused person
before the Court. As a precursor to the discussion, the rights of an accused are linked
to the right to a fair trial under international human rights law and international
humanitarian law and the enforcement of this right at the national, regional and
international levels. The minimum guarantees espoused in this human right are
discussed in the light of the process of arrest and surrender of persons to the Court.
Questions discussed include: what effect does the infringement of these rights have on
the arrest and surrender of a person to the Court and on the trial of the accused person
as a whole and whether there are circumstances surrounding violations of the rights of
the accused that would be so grave as to call for his or her acquittal, or mitigated
sentence? The conduct of the Court Prosecutor in one of the cases is briefly discussed
to highlight these issues. The section concludes with an examination of the effect of
amnesties and immunities (including official immunities and so-called evidentiary
immunities), and their effect on the surrender of accused persons and the subpoena of
witnesses.
In the following section, the innovative rights of victims under the Rome Statute
system are described. The discussion on the right to participate in legal proceedings is
broken down to the different phases of proceedings at the Court: the pre-trial phase;
trial phase; appellate phase and other proceedings arising from the investigation and
prosecution of a case. In the discussion, actual Court practice in determining victim
status and the evaluations of applications to participate in the current situations of the
Court are critically examined. Some observations on how the practice can be
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streamlined in future situations and cases are also made in the interests of oiling the
Rome Statute system of justice. The Chapter concludes with an in-depth analysis of
the right to reparations for victims of international crimes under the Rome Statute.
The right to reparations is influenced by the right to a remedy under traditional public
international law and subsequently individualised under international human rights
law and international humanitarian law. In this context, case law at the national,
regional and international courts is useful to gain an understanding of the right.
Finally the right to reparations in international criminal law as codified in the Rome
Statute is analysed with the assistance of the first case before the Court to establish the
principles applicable in realising the right to reparations to victims of the crimes
within the Court’s jurisdiction.
3.2 THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
3.2.1 Right to a fair trial
The right to a fair trial is a crucial guarantee in the efforts to create and maintain
standards for human rights at the international level. The guarantee of the inalienable
right to a free and fair trial is recognized in a number of international and regional
human rights treaties.130 The very existence of this right in these numerous treaties is
130 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR], Articles 9, 14, & 15; the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27,
1981,21 I.L.M 59 [ hereinafter African Charter], Articles 3, 6, & 7; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter ACHR], Articles 7, 8, & 9; European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5,
as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118
[hereinafter ECHR], Articles. 5, 6, & 7; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[hereinafter GCI],
Article 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GCII],
Article 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII], Article 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV], Article 3; Protocol
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an indication of possible tensions between punishing individuals who are perceived to
be ‘guilty’ of committing gross violations of human rights and the strict adherence of
an accused’s procedural rights in the conduct of his/her trial. Stapleton recognizes this
tension between the minimum procedural guarantees of the right to a fair trial and the
practical considerations involved in trying individuals accused of grave human rights
violations.131 She asks the question whether it is acceptable to compromise the rights
of the accused in order to vindicate victims of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. Stapleton suggests that the Court must guarantee the accused a fair trial and
argues for the impermissibility of any derogation.132
What are these minimum guarantees for a fair trial recognized by international law?
The concept envisions a trial of an accused person that provides a number of
procedural protections as a base standard for conducting the trial. Widely recognised
minimum guarantees include the following rights133:
a) All persons shall be equal before courts and tribunals and are entitled to the
minimum guarantees to fair trial in full equality;
b) The tribunal is competent, independent, impartial, and established by law;
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I],
Article 75 (Fundamental Guarantees); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II], Article 6 (Penal Prosecutions); Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), Article 7; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR],
Articles 9-11.
131 Stapleton S, ‘Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory interpretation and
the impermissibility of derogation’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics, 535-592, 535.
132 Stapleton, supra note 131
133 See provisions of human rights treaties supra note 130.
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c) Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law;
d) The accused has the right to be tried in his presence;
e) The accused has the right to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing; if he does not have legal assistance he shall be
informed of this right; in any case where the interests of justice so require the
accused shall be assigned legal assistance without payment by him if he does
not have sufficient means to pay for it;
f) The accused has the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses against him;
g) The accused has the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he
cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
h) The accused has the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt;
i) No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offense for which he
has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and
penal procedure of each country;
j) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offense was committed.
3.2.2 The Rome Statute and the rights of an accused
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As mentioned above, the right to a fair trial has developed over the years. This is
particularly so in the context of international criminal tribunals and demonstrated by
the substantive provisions relating to the right to a fair trial in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, created by the London Agreement of August 1945 to
prosecute individuals after World War II at Nuremberg, as compared to those of the
ICTR and ICTY Statutes.134
For its part, the Rome Statute is replete with provisions guaranteeing the rights of the
accused as recognized by the international community under major human rights
instruments, humanitarian, and/or customary international law. Article 67 of the Rome
Statute enunciates the following rights of the accused as a part of the minimum
guarantees: the right to be tried without undue delay;135 to be present at trial;136 to
conduct a defense and to counsel assigned and paid for by the Court;137 to examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him or her;138 to have the assistance of an interpreter;139 and not to be
compelled to testify or confess to guilt.140
134 Compare Article 16 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug 18, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82  U.N.T.S. 279, which provides that
In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following procedure shall be followed: (a)
The Indictment.... (b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a Defendant he shall
have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him. (c) A
preliminary examination.... (d) A Defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense
before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel. (e) A defendant shall have the right
through himself or through his Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his
defense, and to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.
with Article 21 ICTY Statute, supra note 3 and Article 20 ICTR Statute, supra note 3 which both
contain more substantive provisions relating to the rights of the accused.
135 Article 67 (1) (c) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
136 Article 67 (1) (d) Rome Statute, supra note 1; this right is limited by sub-section (2) where an
accused may be removed from the courtroom where his conduct continues to disrupt proceedings. Such
an accused will then be placed in a room where he will instruct his counsel using the communication
technology provided.
137 Article 67 (1) (d) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
138 Article 67 (1) (e) Rome Statute, supra note 1
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Article 67 of the Rome Statute contains other guarantees to an accused, which one
would not find in the standard international human rights treaties such as the right to
remain silent ‘without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt
or innocence,’141 the right ‘to male an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her
defense’142 and the right ‘not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the
burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.’143 Additionally, the Rome Statute provides
for the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing;144 to be protected from more
than one trial on the same charges;145 and not to be found guilty of conduct which, at
the time it took place, was not a crime within the court's jurisdiction.146
The Rome Statute is unequivocal on ensuring that the rights of an accused are upheld.
At the investigative stage, the Rome Statute has placed certain mechanisms to ensure
that the integrity of the process is maintained. In this respect, Article 54 (1) (c) obliges
the Prosecutor in the conduct of investigations ‘to fully respect the rights of persons
arising under this Statute.’ Article 55 substantiates further on the rights of persons
during an investigation. These provisions are distinct in the field of international
criminal law in that the Rome Statute codifying the rights that are available to
individuals who may be the subject of pre-trial proceedings before the Court.
3.2.3 Effect of immunities and amnesties on the rights and trial of an accused
139 Article 67 (1) (f) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
140 Article 67 (1) (g) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
141 Article 67 (1) (g) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
142 Article 67 (1) (h) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
143 Article 67 (1) (j) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
144 Article 64 (2) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
145 Article 20 Rome Statute, supra note 1 with the exception being where the previous proceedings
shielded the person from criminal responsibility or the proceedings was not conducted independently or
impartially.
146 Article 22 Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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At the national level, immunities and amnesties granted to individuals prevents courts
of law from exercising jurisdiction over the recipients of these tools. There are various
reasons why amnesties and immunities are given to individuals. In the case of
immunities, they mostly present themselves as barriers to liability for government
officials and international civil servants from national courts while these officials and
civil servants performed their official and sanctioned acts on behalf of the state or
international organisation that they represent.
Amnesties on the other hand are a tool used in societies that are in transition from
gross violations of human rights to democracy and the rule of law. In all cases where
amnesties are used, they serve the purpose of ‘silencing the guns’ of conflict and
assisting in the negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Uganda, a
situation country at the Court where it is reasonably foreseeable that considerations of
amnesty may play in the investigation and prosecution of cases, an Amnesty Act was
legislated in 2000 with the purpose of ending rebellions in Uganda by encouraging
rebels to lay down their arms without fear of prosecution for crimes committed during
the fight against the Government of Uganda. The Amnesty Act of Uganda has three
main functions: providing amnesty to rebels who renounce rebellion and give up their
arms; facilitating an institutionalized resettlement and repatriation process; and
providing reintegration support, including skills training for ex-combatants, and
promoting reconciliation.147
147 Section 2, Amnesty Act 2000 of the Laws of Uganda.
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This section shall reflect on the Rome Statute’s provisions relating to the
investigations and prosecutions of individuals who may be immune from the Courts
jurisdiction or who may be recipients of amnesties with respect to crimes within the
subject matter of the Court.
3.2.3.1 Official and evidentiary immunities
Part III of the Rome Statute dealing with the general principles of criminal law is
useful in assessing the effects of immunities on an individual alleged to have
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. In this Part III, the Rome
Statute clarifies instances where the Court will and will not exercise jurisdiction over
an individual.148 Most of these provisions are reflective of norms in international law.
Article 26 elucidates the exclusion of jurisdiction by the Court ‘over any person under
the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime’. In the situation in the
DRC and Uganda, child soldiers were used in the armed conflict that existed in those
countries. The reality of the situations is that these child soldiers were mostly forcibly
recruited into the groups as the Trial Chamber found in the Prosecutor v Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo.149
Whereas the Office of the Prosecutor has taken a strategy to investigate and prosecute
‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’ for crimes in any given situation, it is
unlikely that a person under the age of 18 years would bear this responsibility. Some
commentators however mention that there is a lacuna in the Statute on how to deal
148 According to Article 25 (1) Rome Statue, supra note 1, the Court only exercises jurisdiction over
natural persons.
149 On March 14 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was found guilty of the war crime of conscripting child
soldiers. See Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute in Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 14
March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842
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with persons who are not children under the age of 15 years as expressed in other
international human rights treaties but have yet to attain the age of 18 years at the time
when the crimes were committed. Dominic Ongwen, one of the LRA commanders
still at large with an outstanding warrant of arrest issued by the Court is a case in
point. Studies by the Justice and Reconciliation Project, a civil society organisation
operating in northern Uganda suggest that while Dominic Ongwen was abducted as a
child and recruited as a soldier by the LRA, he ‘excelled’ in his designated duties and
was elevated to become a senior commander by the LRA leader Joseph Kony.
Dominic Ongwen and others like him may have committed crimes between the ages
of 15 and 18 years, for which the Court would not have jurisdiction stricto senso, yet
such an individual may bear criminal responsibility based on national criminal law.
The domestication of the Rome Statute may also present a challenge at the national
level in relation to Article 17 where there is (or should exist) the capacity within
national criminal justice systems to deal with juvenile cases. Unless cured at the
national level, such a gap may undermine efforts in the local fight against impunity
for international crimes.
Article 27 provides that:
“This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence…Immunities or special
procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
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under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.”
Official capacity as Head of State or Government has been a ground to exclude
criminal capacity and was supported by diplomatic relations among States150 as well
as supported by national laws.151 It is as a result of the irrelevance of official capacity
at the Court that an arrest warrant was issued against the President of the Sudan Omar
Al-Bashir and other government ministers, and summonses to appear issued to the
Deputy Prime Minister of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and other ministers in the Kenyan
government. As discussed in Chapter I, these arrest warrants and summonses to
appear have various effects on the cooperation between the Sudan, Kenya and other
African States with the Court.
Article 31 of the Rome Statute presents grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
and may count as forms of evidentiary immunity. They include: mental illness
incapacitating a person from appreciating unlawfulness of an act;152 intoxication
which vitiates appreciation of unlawfulness of an act;153 self-defence;154 unlawful act
committed under duress or threat of imminent death or serious injury.155 Article 32 of
the Rome Statute provides that a mistake of fact or law, which negates mens rea,
excludes criminal responsibility and as read with Article 33 of the Rome Statute, a
150 Decision by the ICJ inThe Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, DRC v. Belgium
illustrates this.
151 The Constitutions and other national legislations provide that the Head of State or Government shall
be liable for civil or criminal charges while they occupy the position.
152 Article 31 (1) (a) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
153 Article 31 (1) (b) Rome Statute, supra note 1; the exception to this rule is when a person voluntarily
gets intoxicated under circumstances that the person knew that as a result of intoxication, he or she
would commit an unlawful act.
154 Article 31 (1) (c) Rome Statute, supra note 1; the exception also applies to threats to property
essential for survival of people. Interestingly military necessity is not in itself a ground to exclude
criminal responsibility.
155 Article 31 (1) (d) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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mistake of law only exempts a person from criminal liability where they have
received an order from a superior without knowing the order was unlawful.156
3.2.3.2 Amnesties and the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute does not deal with the question of amnesties. Stahn however
mentions three instances where the Court may be faced with the issues of amnesties:
in the review of a decision of the Prosecutor not to initiate an investigation or
prosecution under Article 53 (3); a ruling on admissibility under Article 18 and 19;
and a deferral of investigation or prosecution under Article 16.157 Stahn presents the
scenario where an amnesty is issued by a state where crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction are alleged to have taken place. As Article 17 (1) (a) and (b) require an
investigation, which does not necessarily mean a criminal investigation, the
possibility of a conditional amnesty combined with a truth and reconciliation
procedure may satisfy the investigation requirement.158 The Appeals Chamber
decision on the admissibility challenge by the Government of Kenya however seems
to suggest that for purposes of establishing that a State is able to deal with crimes to
the exclusion of the Court, the state must demonstrate that there exists national
criminal investigations or trials for the same individuals as are being investigated by
the Court and for the same conduct in question. The Appeals Chamber rejected the
general truth and reconciliation process in Kenya as a possible avenue to deal with the
crimes committed during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in that country. In any
156 Article 33 (2) Rome Statute, supra note 1, provides that orders to commit the crimes within the
Court’s jurisdiction remain unlawful.
157 Stahn C, ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some interpretive
guidelines for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) Journal of International Criminal Justice, 695 –
716 [hereinafter Stahn], 695-699
158 Stahn, supra note 157, 698
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event, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act of 2008 clearly provides, in keeping
with norms in international law on the question of amnesties, that there shall be no
amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.159
Amnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of States to provide
accountability for serious crimes under international law including war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide.160 If a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or
admissibility of a case be raised by any party on account of an amnesty, the Court
remains the final arbiter according to Article 19 and as discussed in Chapter II. The
Court has not made any pronouncements on the legalities of amnesties for purposes of
prosecutions at the Court. Nevertheless, from the emerging norm of the
impermissibility of an amnesty for certain crimes, including those for which the Court
has jurisdiction, it is reasonable to foresee that any amnesty, conditional or otherwise,
granted to a person alleged to have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court, will not exclude such a person from criminal responsibility and accountability
before the Court. As to the surrender of the individuals alleged to have committed
these crimes or the subpoena of witnesses with evidence that may assist the Court in
the determination of innocence or guilt of an accused, states are obliged to cooperate
with the Court within the meaning of Part IX and as discussed in Chapter I regardless
of the immunities or amnesties that may apply. Article 71 provides for sanctions for
persons before the Court, but the complexities of cooperation of reluctant witnesses
159 Section 34 (2) and (3) Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act no 6 of 2008 provides:
(2) The Commission may in accordance with this Part, and subject to subsection (3),
recommend the grant of conditional amnesty to any person liable to any penalty under any law
in Kenya.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), no amnesty may be recommended by the Commission in
respect of genocide, crimes against humanity, gross violation of human rights or an act,
omission or offence constituting a gross violation of human right including extrajudicial
execution, enforced disappearance, sexual assault, rape and torture.
160 Stahn, supra note 157, 701
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64
away from the Court are not sufficiently addressed. The practice of the two ad hoc
Tribunals on how to deal with the complexities of cooperation – often in difficult
political environments is useful.161 Nevertheless, the Rome Statute does not support
the evaluation of these issues to national courts, but rather to interpretation by the
Court judges.
3.3 THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
The Rome Statute has codified the rights of victims of international crimes for the
first time in the history of international law. Victims of the core crimes are entitled to
the right to participate in legal proceedings before the Court as well as the right to
receive reparations. It may be important to first assess how this right of victims of
international crimes arose under international law and how the right has developed
over the years to the right to participate in legal proceedings and to reparations at the
Court.
3.3.1 The right to participate in legal proceedings
The participation of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in legal
proceedings is said to be one of the major achievements of modern day international
161 For more on the complexities of co-operation between international criminal tribunals and states, see
Peskin V, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans – Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State
Cooperation (2008) Cambridge. See further Decision on assigned counsel application for interview and
testimony of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, 9
December 2005 and the earlier decision in Decision on Application for Subpoenas, Prosecutor v.
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 1 July 2003.
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criminal justice.162 This status to express “views and concerns” through legal
representation had never before been accorded to victims at an international criminal
tribunal.  The shift in the Rome Statue from provisions purely retributive in nature to
incorporating restorative aspects of justice through the inclusion of this right of
victims to participate in the proceedings was in response to criticisms of the ad hoc
Tribunals where there was no provision in the ICTR and ICTY Statutes expressly
addressing victims.163 In incorporating this right to participate in legal proceedings,
the drafters of the Rome Statute were cognizant of this new role that victims would
play in dispensing international criminal justice and particularly that the right to
participate in legal proceedings may give a measure of satisfaction to those who have
suffered harm.164
The general principle that victims have a right to participate in proceedings is
captured in Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute. Earlier provisions of the Rome Statute
also specify proceedings in which victims’ views must be sought.165 Article 68 (3)
provides that:
“Where the personal interests of victims are affected, the Court shall permit
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which
162 Chung “Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are concessions of the Court
clouding the promise” 2008 6 Northwestern University Journal of Human Rights 159-227, 159.
163 Jorda C & de Hemptinne J, The Status and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1387, 1388 (Antonio Cassese et al.
eds., 2002) (stating that the Rome Statute “appears to mark a new step forward ... victims are accorded
the double status denied to them by the provisions setting up the ad hoc Tribunals. First they are able to
take part in the criminal process.... Secondly, they are entitled to seek form the Court reparations ....”).
164 See Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, Definition of Victims and General Principle, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 427, 429 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001)
165 Under Article 15 Rome Statute, supra note 1, victims may be heard when the Prosecutor
commences investigations proprio motu; under Article 19 Rome Statute supra note 1, victims may be
heard when questions relating to jurisdiction or admissibility are raised; and under Article 53 Rome
Statute, supra note 1, as read with Rule 92(2) RPE victims may be heard when the Prosecutor
determines not to investigate or prosecute based on the interests of justice.
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is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”
Victims can present these views and concerns through their legal representatives and
in accordance with the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).  In particular,
victims have an absolute right to attend trial proceedings,166 a discretionary right to
participate in the questioning of witnesses,167 the right to participate in pre-trial
procedure such as investigations168, the right to be heard on matters relating to
decisions on reparations169 and to intervene in appeals concerning reparation orders.170
Article 68(3) also curtails victims’ right to participate where they would infringe on
the rights of the accused. In this sense, there is a balancing of interests among the
parties in the proceedings. Lee observes that ‘victims do not have the right to become
a genuine party to the proceedings, but they do have the right to be represented before
the ICC.’171
3.3.1.1 Victims’ participation in the phases of proceedings
At the outset, victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court can only
participate in proceedings once the Court’s jurisdiction has been seized in accordance
with Article 12. Participation of these victims in Court proceedings is not automatic.
166 Rule 91 (2) RPE
167 Rule 91 (3) RPE
168 Article 15 (3) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
169 Article 75 (3) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
170 Article 82(4) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
171 Lee ‘XI’ in The International Criminal Court: Elements Of Crimes And Rules Of Procedure And
Evidence.
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Victims who fall under a situation that is before the Court must fulfil certain
requirements to participate on Court proceedings. Rule 89 of the RPE suggests that
each individual victim must prepare an application to the relevant Chamber for
determination of victim status. The interpretation by the judges at the ICC of this right
to participate in legal proceedings has however drawn much attention and it is
meritorious to reflect on the various interpretations of the right to participate in legal
proceedings.
3.3.1.2 Participation at the investigative stage of proceedings
Aldana-Pindell points that ‘the Rome Statute and ICC RPE do not grant victims
complete autonomy to make decisions regarding either the initiation of criminal
investigation or how the investigation should proceed before trial.’172 Investigative
powers lie squarely on the Prosecutor in accordance with Article 42 of the Rome
Statute. What then is the role of victims at the investigative stage of proceedings at the
Court? The first decision on this right to participate was issued in January 2006 by the
Pre-Trial Chamber in the investigation of crimes in the situation in the DRC and
effectively the first interpretation of Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute.173 The Pre-
Trial Chamber, while recognizing that the general right to participate in the
investigation stage of proceedings was not expressly granted by the Rome Statute,
nevertheless granted victims the right to participate in the investigative stage of the
proceedings. The Chamber found that this participation of victims was “consistent
172 See Aldana-Pindell, ‘In vindication of justiciable victims’ right to truth and justice for state-
sponsored crimes’ 35Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1399-1501, 1429.
173 Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Public
Redacted Version, para. 63 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter 17 January 2006 DRC
Decision].
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with the object and purpose of the victims participation regime established by the
drafters of the Statue.”174 Article 68(3) therefore imposes an obligation on the Court
vis-à-vis persons recognised as victims in terms of which they are authorised,
irrespective of ‘any specific proceedings being conducted in the framework of such an
investigation, to be heard by the Chamber in order to present their views and concerns
and to file documents pertaining… [to an] investigation of … [a] situation’.175 Article
68(3) entails both substantive and procedural elements of the right to participation in
that it affords individuals standing to claim their status as victims and to assert their
recognised rights.
At the investigative stage, victims known to the Office of the Prosecutor and the
Registry may express their views and concerns where a Pre-Trial Chamber adopts
measures in relation to the protection of persons and evidence. This includes the
protection and privacy of witnesses and victims; preservation of evidence; protection
of arrested persons176 or those who have appeared in response to summons; and the
protection of national security information.177 Equally, a unique investigative
opportunity may arise, which requires immediate security of evidence, thus
necessitating adoption of measures considered essential for the defence trial. Victims
may also express their views and concerns during such unique investigative
opportunity. Victims, through their legal representatives also participate in the pre-
trial phase of the confirmation of charges proceedings.
174 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 173, para. 50
175 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 173, para 200-237
176 Victim representation in the situation in Libya is on-going at the Court although the suspects Saif Al-
Islam and Mohammed Al-Senussi are under arrest in Libyan government custody.
177 Articles 57(3) (c) and Article 54(3) (f) Rome Statute, supra note 1, in relation to the duties of the
Prosecutor.
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Victims in a number of cases before the Court have expressed their views and
concerns about the charges that have been brought against suspects who have been
arrested or summoned to appear before the Court.178 The concluded confirmation of
charges hearings in the two Kenya cases Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali and
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang highlighted challenges in victim participation and
legal representation at the Court. On several occasions, Victims’ Legal
Representatives lodged complaints about the lack of access to their clients owing to
either security situation in Kenya or the lack of adequate funds from the Registry to
effectively consult and confer with clients. In both cases, Victims’ Legal
Representatives were based outside of Kenya. As a result of these hiccups, the Trial
Chamber seized with the matter has recently decided that the victims in the Kenya
cases would be represented by local counsel who would interface with the Office for
the Public Counsel for Victims. No doubt, effective participation at the pre-trial stage
not only sets the tone for the trial stage but also is imperative for the effective exercise
of victims’ rights in the entire Court process.
Chung notes two major developments following the first decision to grant
participatory rights to victims at the investigative stage of proceedings. First, due to
the slow processing of hundreds of applications from victims in the situations under
investigation by the Court, in the Darfur region of The Sudan; the DRC; northern
Uganda; and the Central African Republic (“CAR”), there was growing evidence that
the system of victims’ participation established in the early decisions was failing the
very victims it was meant to serve.179
178 Victims were represented in the confirmation charges in the following cases: Kenya, DRC, CAR,
Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur
179 Chung, supra note 162, 160
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Van den Wyngaert supports this critical failing and explains that the process of
receiving individual applications from victims, in standard forms plus supporting
evidence, which often have to be translated to one of the Court’s official languages, is
a long and cumbersome process.180 These applications are also circulated to the
different parties for their observations before a final determination is made by the
judges - first to grant victim status and then to confer the right to participate in a
proceeding. Moreover, an order issued by a Chamber granting a victim the right to
participate in any one stage of the proceedings does not guarantee that they can
participate in subsequent stages of the proceedings. Victims are compelled to submit
further applications for assessment of the personal interest181 at every stage of
proceedings. Van den Wyngaert laments that this process may work in a national
proceeding where the number of victims is not as voluminous as at the Court. The
case-by-case approach adopted by the Court inevitably delays legal proceedings and
may not be sustainable as the number of situations and cases increase.182 This
problem, in the practice of the Court, was discussed at the conference in Rome prior
to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Some delegates at the Rome conference mostly
having the adversarial model in mind had feared the ‘crippling effect’ of granting
participatory rights to victims beyond their more traditional role as witnesses.183
Chung further notes that, two years after this first decision on victims’ right to
participate in legal proceedings was issued, the second development relates to the Pre-
180 Van den Wyngaert “Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some views and concerns of an
ICC Trial Judge” 2011 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 475-493, 478
181 In the 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 173, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view is that
applications by victims will be on a case-by case basis to determine the impact of the victims’ interests.
182 Van den Wyngaert, supra note 180, 479-480
183 Mekjian GJ & Varughese MC,‘Hearing the Victims’ Voice: Analysis of victims’ advocate
participation in the trial proceeding of the International Criminal Court’ 2005 XVII 1 Pace University
School of Law Journal 1-49, 19.
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Trial Chamber’s granting leave for an appeal to determine whether the various
decisions of the Pre Trial Chambers had correctly interpreted the governing rules to
permit them to grant a “procedural status of victim” or theoretical right to participate,
during the investigative and pre-trial stages of the proceedings.184 There was an urgent
need to clarify how applications for participation in the investigative and pre-trial
stages of proceedings are to be dealt with.
3.3.1.3 Participation at the Trial Stage of Proceedings
The trial stage is the most visible platform for victims participating in legal
proceedings at the Court. In this stage, victims are not only represented as witnesses
called by either the Prosecution or the Defence, but they are considered as a party to
the trial proceedings represented by Counsel of their choice. Concern has been raised
that the presence of victims as a party in the trial stage unduly prejudices the accused
in that Counsel for Victims may take on the role of Prosecutor bis. Musila notes that
The Prosecutor’s and victims’ interests do not always converge and that the
Prosecutor may often be driven by the singular objective in the furtherance of
her/his law enforcement function – establishing guilt as efficiently as possible,
184 Chung, supra note 162, 161; See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-118, Decision
on Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCV on the Production of
Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2) (e) of the Regulations of the Court
and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor,” Public, 7-8 (Pre-Trial Chamber I,
Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter First Darfur Grant of Appeal]; Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-438, Decision on Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the
Requests of the OPCV on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to
Regulation 86(2) (e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by
the Prosecutor,” Public, 7-8 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter First DRC Grant of
Appeal].
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a fact that may lead to ignoring issues central to victims’ claims and
concerns.185
If the first trial at the Court in the case Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is
anything to go by, the trial judges are astute and have been seen to uphold the rights
of the accused to a fair trial.
The trial process in an adversarial system presupposes that the Prosecution will build
its case against the accused and discharge the burden of proof. The Defence on its part
will make submissions aimed at creating a reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crimes for which s/he is charged. The Court’s RPE however have
adopted a hybrid version of both the adversarial and inquisitorial system much like the
RPE of the ICTR and ICTY. In the Court’s context, the inclusion of the expression of
victims’ views and concerns is akin to the partie civile under the French legal system.
How do the trials at the Court run? All parties, including victims’ legal representatives
make oral presentations and interventions at the hearing, through written submissions
or both. Victims’ legal representatives are not silent observers during proceedings and
the Pre-Trial Chamber in the situation in the DRC supports this.186 It is true as well
that victims’ legal representative are permitted to observe proceedings and make
submissions based on their observations.187 Rule 89 RPE directs that victims’ legal
representatives can make opening and closing statements. It provides in relevant
portion:
185 Musila G, Rethinking International Criminal Justice: Restorative justice and the rights of victims at
the International Criminal Court, (Berlin, Lap Lambert Academic Publishing) 2011, 153.
186 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) Decision on
the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/001/06, a/002/06 and a/003/06 at the Confirmation
Hearing, 22 September 2006  [hereinafter Lubanga Confirmation Hearing] at 6 – the Pre-Trial
Chamber confirmed that Victims’ Legal Representatives can make opening and closing statements.
187 Rule 91 (2) RPE; See written submissions relating to Lubanga Confirmation Hearing
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“[…] Subject to the provisions of sub-rule 2, the Chamber shall then specify
the proceedings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate,
which may include making opening and closing statements.”
Rule 91(2) provides that:
“A legal representative of a victim shall be entitled to attend and participate in
the proceedings in accordance with the terms of the ruling of the Chamber and
any modification thereof given under rules 89 and 90. This shall include
participation in the hearings unless, in the circumstances of the case, the
Chamber concerned is of the view that the representative’s interventions
should be confined to written observations or submissions. The Prosecutor and
the Defence shall be allowed to reply to any oral or written observation by the
legal representative for victims.”
The RPE support the role of the legal representative to intervene in the trial
proceedings by questioning a witness, an expert or an accused.188 However, the Trial
Chamber reserves the right to regulate the right to question in terms of Rule 91(3) (b)
to take into account ‘the rights of the accused, interests of witnesses, the need for a
fair, impartial and expeditious trial and to give effect to Article 68 paragraph 3’,
which relates to personal interests of the victims, appropriateness and the defendant’s
rights. The Appeals Chamber has endorsed the position that Rule 92(5) RPE which
provides for a mandatory right for victims or their legal representatives to be notified
in a timely fashion of all public proceedings and filings before the Court. In the
Appeals Chamber’s, view, victims will additionally be afforded access to confidential
188 Rule 91(3)(a) RPE
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material to the extent that such access does not breach other necessary protective
measures if in the view of the Chamber a victim’s personal interests are materially
affected. In the RPE and Chambers’ decisions, we see that the Court judges’ have
ensured that this innovative aspect of legal proceedings that includes a new party –
victims – does not prejudice the accused and does not create a Prosecutor bis
situation. The Trial Chamber remains in control of the interventions of victims’ legal
representatives.
Victims are permitted to participate in reparations proceedings, which commence at
the end of a trial and where an accused has been found guilty of the offences with
which (s) he is charged. Reparations proceedings commence at the Trial Chamber and
are subject to appeals. In this regard, Article 82(4) Rome Statute provides that:
“Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take
account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims,
other interested persons or interested States.”189
Legal representatives are invited to make submissions orally, in writing or both as the
Chamber pleases relating to orders for reparations that it will make.
3.3.1.4 Participation at the appellate stage and other proceedings
Victims are allowed to participate in appellate proceedings where their interests are
shown to be affected. The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
agreed with victims and the Prosecutor that since the Trial Chamber’s ruling to
189 Article 82(4) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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dismiss charges against the accused based on abuses by the Prosecutor of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute,
affected victims’ interests in that they could no longer participate in the trial and
concomitantly would not be able to request for reparations in the case, the victims
could then participate in the appellate proceedings and submit their views and
concerns pertaining to the Prosecutor’s motion to appeal.190
Where there is an appeal relating to reparations orders, Rule 91 (4) RPE provides as
follows:
“A legal representative of the victim, the convicted person or a bona fide
owner of property adversely affected by an order under Article 75 may appeal
against the order for reparations, as provided in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.”
3.3.2 Victims’ rights to reparations under international law
Reparations are the embodiment of a society’s recognition, remorse and atonement for
harms inflicted.191 To an extent, reparations represent the acknowledgment that the
recipient has experienced some form of harm and that there is a need to redress this
harm and restore the individual to the place that (s)he was before the harm took place.
However, it is clear that in so many instances that it is not possible to fully restore the
individual who has gone through the trauma of an event to the state prior to the event,
particularly because restoration is not merely a matter of quantum. This is true in the
190 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal’ 6
August 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13.
191 Roht-Arriaza N, ‘Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas’ (2004) 27 Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review, 157-219 [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza], at 159.
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case of killings, torture, rape and even destruction to personal property, which has
sentimental value attached to it. In these cases reparations are not to be seen as
replacement of what was lost because that is not possible as illustrated above, but
reparations are aimed at assisting the harmed individual to, in a sense move on with
their lives in a positive sense.
There has been a progressively growing legal basis for the redressing victims of gross
violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law. Reparations
has long been a recognized principle of international law and evidenced in human
rights instruments as well as in the decisions of regional human rights and national
courts. It has a basis in both tort (delict) and the law governing state responsibility.192
Van Boven describes reparations in human rights, as a generic term representing ‘all
types of redress, material and non-material, for victims of human rights violations’.193
Reparations can encompass a variety of concepts including damages, redress,
compensation, satisfaction and restitution.194 Each component represents a unique
remedy to victims. Compensation refers to the amount of money awarded by a
judicial or quasi-judicial body after an assessment of harm suffered. Restitution is a
return to the situation before the harm occurred. Rehabilitation refers to the provision
of on-going social, medical, legal and/or psychological care to victims. Satisfaction
refers to broader measures, which may be individual or societal, such as the
192 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 193.
193 Van Boven T, ‘Study Concerning the right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ UN Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 of 2 July 1993 [hereinafter Van Boven], para 13.
194 Van Boven, supra note 193; See also Saul B ‘Compensation for Unlawful Death in International
Law: A focus on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2004) 19 American University
International Law Review 523-584, at 541
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verification of facts, the search for bodily remains, public apologies, memorialisation,
institutional reforms and sanctioning of perpetrators.
Reparations can be material (compensation, restitution and rehabilitation) or moral.
Moral reparations can include a range of non-material measures which address the
victim’s felt-needs to be heard, for justice and for measures to avoid repetition of the
violating act such as the removal of those most responsible from positions of power
and influence, the disclosure of the facts of a victim’s mistreatment or official, public
apologies from governments for past violations.195
Before assessing the right to reparations for individuals as is the possibility under the
Rome Statute, the following section shall reflect on the evolution of this right in the
form of remedies from a state-centric approach based on traditional international law
to the individualised approach stemming from the development of human rights
treaties.
3.3.2.1 Inter-State remedies
Traditional international law placed States at the centre of the law of nations.
Remedies at the international level were therefore associated with principles of state
responsibility. As stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) in
the Chorzow Factory case, the obligation to make reparation to another State for the
breach of an international legal obligation is a fundamental principle of international
195 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 191, 159.
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law.196 The International Law Commission (“ILC”) has codified this principle.197
Some conservative interpretations of international law continue to limit reparations to
the inter-state level. Consequently aggrieved nationals of any state can only be
redressed where their claims are espoused by their state of nationality and the claim is
made against another state for the harm caused to the individual.198 However, since
World War II (WWII), international law has shifted dramatically, in both theory and
practice, towards the protection of individual human rights and as such, international
law now guarantees an individual right to reparation.199
3.3.2.2 Remedies under international and regional human rights treaties
The cause of the shift from State to individual-centric understanding of remedies has
been the development of international human rights law. Most human rights treaties
concluded since WWII includes a right to a remedy.200 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), one of two core human rights treaties, demands
that each State Party ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are violated
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
196 Chorzow Factory case (Jurisdiction); ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, para.184; The Wall Advisory Opinion.
197 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Articles 30-31 and
34-37.
198 For an example of a conservative interpretation of international law, Diplomatic protection was first
espoused by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case.  See also Final Report of
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni: The Right to Restitution, Compensation, and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
UNESCOR, 56th Sess. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, (January 18, 2000) [hereinafter Bassiouni], at 6.
199 Though the method by which this reparation is achieved is still open to debate. Shelton D,
‘Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles of State Responsibility’ 96 American Journal of
International Law (2002), 833-856 [hereinafter Shelton], at 834. See also the Darfur Commission of
Inquiry Report, paras. 596-597, which states the universal recognition of the right to an effective
remedy, has a bearing on State responsibility.  Thus, an offending State now has an international
responsibility to make reparations towards the victims of an internationally wrongful act (which
includes international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes).
200 See also Shelton, supra note 199, 843; Bassiouni, supra note 198, 7.
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by persons acting in an official capacity.201 Furthermore, it states that the claim to a
remedy should be determined by a competent authority (judicial, administrative,
legislative or otherwise) imbued with the power to enforce any remedies ordered.202
The right to a remedy has been found to contain both procedural and substantive
components.203 Procedurally, the right to remedy broadly entails that the State afford
the victim access to justice.  This entails the creation of appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic
law.204 Generally speaking, this means that the victim should have their claim heard
by an independent and impartial remedial body with the ability to afford adequate
redress for the alleged violation.205 Substantively, the United Nations Human Rights
Council (“UNHRC”) has stated that the right to an effective remedy requires States to
make reparations to individuals whose rights have been violated.  Such reparation can
include, among other measures, restitution, rehabilitation and satisfaction (including
public apologies, construction of memorials and the prosecution of human rights
violators).206
Remedies are also available for violations of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).  Though the rights guaranteed in this treaty
are to be realised progressively,207 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has stated that it considers the rights contained in the ICESCR to be capable of
direct and immediate operation within the domestic legal system of each State
201 Article 2(3) (a) ICCPR.
202 Article 2(3)1(b)-(c) ICCPR.
203 Shelton, supra note 199, 839.
204 UNHRC General Comment No. 31, para. 15.
205 Shelton, supra note 199, 839.
206 UNHRC General Comment No. 31, para. 16.
207 Article 2(1) ICESCR.
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Party.208 Furthermore, States have been encouraged to create accessible, timely and
effective judicial or administrative remedies for all justiciable ICESCR rights.209
The right to a remedy is also reflected in every regional human rights treaty.  For
example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms as
set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”210 The American Convention of Human Rights
(“ACHR”) empowers the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) to
“rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted
the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to
the injured party.”211 Lastly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“ACHPR”) contains provisions ensuring access to justice, the right to adequate
compensation in the case of spoliation of resources and enshrining judicial
independence.212 The absence of an explicit and general guarantee of a right to an
effective remedy has been somewhat addressed by the conclusion of the Protocol to
Establish the African Court on Human and People’s Rights which empowers the
Court to “make appropriate orders to remedy [a] violation, including the payment of
fair compensation or reparation.”213
208 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9
209 Shelton, supra note 199, 847; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 3; ECOSOC, GC No. 9
210 Article 13, ECHR.
211 Article 63, ACHR.
212 Articles 7, 21(2) and 26 ACHPR
213 Article 27(1) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
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A State which fails to protect an individual’s human rights commits an independent,
further violation if it also denies the victims of those violations an effective remedy.
While most scholars seem relatively firm in this opinion, the areas of controversy in
this field surround the precise contours of the effective remedy and whether it can be
provided through different means. Some international treaties specify particular
means by which remedy must be afforded214 while the ICCPR remains relatively open
to judicial, administrative and other methods being used.
3.3.2.3 The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Reparations
The right to reparations developed further in 1985 with the conclusion of the United
Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power (hereinafter Basic Principles of Justice).215 Though focused on domestic
crimes, these principles set forth comprehensive standards for a State’s obligation to
provide reparations to individual victims of crime.216 The principles state that redress
should be granted through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair,
inexpensive and accessible. The principles also state that perpetrators should provide
reparations directly and that States should establish national reparations funds to
compensate in the event of a perpetrator’s indigence.217 Lastly, the Basic Principles of
Justice state that victims participate in proceedings which affect their personal
214 Convention Against Torture, Art 14 specifies that States Parties are to ensure victims of torture
obtain redress and have an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.  Though it should be
noted that even in this case, litigation surrounding the Convention Against Torture has revealed that
reparations can still be denied when a claim is brought outside of the State in which the torture took
place.  See Al-Adsani v. Kuwait; Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom.
215 Basic Principles of Justice.
216 Bassiouni, supra note 198, 9.
217 Basic Principles of Justice, Annex, A, 8; Annex, A, 4; Annex, A, 5.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
82
interests.218 There is a connection between the Basic Principles of Justice’s concern
for victim’s dignity and participation and the inclusion of victim’s participation and
reparation provisions in the Rome Statute.219
The Basic Principles of Justice helped to lay the foundation for the eventual
conclusion of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Basic Principles and
Guidelines).220 While not legally-binding221, the Basic Principles and Guidelines aim
to consolidate and organize existing obligations to as great a degree as possible.
Thus, several prominent voices in international law consider them to be representative
of the current status of the right to reparations under international law.222 The Basic
Principles and Guidelines state that the right to reparation is part of the State’s core
obligation to respect, ensure respect and implement international human rights law
and international humanitarian law.223 They enshrine three basic rights for victims of
international crimes: the right of access to justice, the right to reparation for harm
suffered and the right to truth.224 With respect to reparation, any measures provided
should be “proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harms suffered” and
should be derived from the perpetrator, if possible, with the State providing monetary
218 This encouragement was qualified as the Basic Principles of Justice seek to ensure such
participation is in line with the rights of the accused and relevant national criminal law and procedure,
Basic Principles of Justice, Annex, A, 6 (b).
219 Ferstman C, “NGOs and the Role of Victims in International Criminal Justice” Seminar organised
by the Forum for International Criminal Justice and Conflict, Monday 2 October 2006
220 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, GA Res., UNGAOR, 60th Sess., UN Doc. A/Res/60/147 (16 December 2005) [hereinafter Basic
Principles and Guidelines]
221 Rombouts et al, in De Feyter, 362.
222 Van Boven, in Ferstman et al, 32.
223 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle I, (1); II (3) (d).
224 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220; Bassiouni, supra note 198, 28-34.
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compensation when this is not possible.225 Reparations judgments should be
enforceable domestically and reparation is deemed to include restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.226
Restitution should seek to “restore the victim to the original situation before the gross
violations” occurred.227 Compensation should be provided for any economically
assessable damage including, among other things, physical and mental harm, lost
economic opportunities, material damages (loss of earnings or earnings potential),
moral damages and costs (medical, psychological, and the like).228 Rehabilitation
includes medical, psychological care and legal and social services.229 Satisfaction
measures include the cessation of a continuing violation, verification of facts and
public disclosure of the truth, the location of the disappeared, assistance with the
recovery, identification and reburial of bodies in accordance with the victim’s
family’s wishes and cultural practices.230 Moreover, satisfaction also includes various
symbolic reparations such as official declarations or judicial decisions restoring the
dignity of the victim or their family, public apologies or commemorations and tributes
to the victims.231 Satisfaction also entails longer term goals, such as the creation and
promotion of mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their
resolution.232 Lastly, guarantees of non-repetition include, among other things,
ensuring that the military is under civilian control, that all judicial proceedings accord
with due process and that judicial independence is ensured.233
225 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle, IX, (15).
226 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle, IX, (17-18).
227 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle IX, (19).
228 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle IX, (20)
229 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle, IX, (21)
230 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle, IX, (22) (a)-(c).
231 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle IX, (22) (d), (e), (g).
232 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle, IX, (23) (g).
233 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 220, Principle IX, (23), (a)-(c).
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3.3.2.4 Remedies under international humanitarian law (IHL)
Though strongly debated, IHL contains elements of a right to a remedy.  The 1907
Hague Convention requires that a State which violates its terms pay compensation.234
The Geneva Conventions furthered this protection by formally prohibiting agreements
between States which would absolve liability for ‘grave breaches’ of IHL.235
Furthermore, Additional Protocol I reaffirmed that a party to an international armed
conflict which violates its IHL obligations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation and bear responsibility for the actions of individuals in its armed
forces.236
However, despite the seemingly explicit provisions in the IHL treaties above, the
existence of an individual right to reparation for violations is IHL is contested.237
Some argue that under IHL, individuals are limited to asking the State of their
nationality to espouse a claim for diplomatic protection and assert claims for
compensation from the violating State in question.  Others, including the International
Committee of the Red Cross, argue that the trend of international law is towards the
recognition of the individual’s right to a remedy and specifically reparations in the
context of IHL violations.238 For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to note that
reparations of some kind (whether requested by a State or an individual) are due to
victims of international crimes.
234 Article 3, 1907 Hague Convention.
235 Article 148, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
August 12, 1949.
236 Art. 91, Additional Protocol I.
237 See contra, Bassiouni, supra note 198, 9; ICRC Customary IHL Study Rules, 537, 541-546.
238 ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL Study Rules, 537 and discussion of State practice at 541-546.
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3.3.2.5 Reparations in practice at the international level
Practice at the international level with regard to giving effect to the right to
reparations has, in general, been disappointing.  There have been some individual
successes, but there has been little actual compensation to victims for violations.239
The UNHRC generally issues general or declaratory decisions and affords States a
large margin of appreciation on specific reparation awards.240 Nevertheless, in cases
pertaining to the right to life and the prohibition of torture, the UNHRC has expressed
the view that States are under a legal obligation to investigate, take actions thereon,
bring to justice the persons found responsible and extend treatment to the victims.241
The UNHRC has also recommended the payment of “adequate” or “appropriate
compensation” in recent cases.242 Though underwhelming, the UNHRC’s decisions
can be conceived as providing victims of human rights abuses a measure of
satisfaction and a guarantee against non-repetition.
States have also provided reparations to victims by means of inter-State negotiation.
For example, as a result of international negotiation and lobbying, Holocaust victims
have been compensated by Germany through a variety of means.  Under the German
weidergutmachung law, individual compensation was given to victims or the State of
Israel (if no living survivors).  In total, Germany has provided $104 billion to victims
of Nazi crimes.  It has also provided apologies, restitution of lost property,
239 Sarkin, in De Feyter, 155.
240 Oette, in Ferstman et al, 219.
241 Van Boven, in Ferstman et al, 23.
242 Rombouts et al, in De Feyter, 377 referring to the UNHRC decisions Sminova v. Russia; Perterer v.
Austria; Kankanamge v. Sri Lanka. The preference for general recommendations to pay compensation
is echoed in the practice of the UN Committee Against Torture. See Oette, in Ferstman et al, 238.
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compensatory pensions and other measures aimed to supplement the material
compensation provided by legal measures.243
Claims Commissions provide another method for victims to obtain reparations from
States for violations of international law.  Through institutions such as the UN Claims
Commission and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, victims have been able to
gain some measure of reparations.244 Lastly, several international reparations funds,
such as the Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, have been established to provide
compensation to victims.  This fund is supported by voluntary donations from States,
organizations and individuals and provides funding to non-governmental
organizations which assist torture victims and their families.  It is one of the largest
United Nations humanitarian funds with a budget of $13 million.245 Other examples
of international reparations funds include the UN Voluntary Trust Fund on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, the UN Development Program Trust Fund for
Rwanda and the Court’s Trust Fund for Victims ("TFV").
3.3.2.6 Reparations in practice at the regional level
243 Bassiouni, supra note 198, 10; Shelton, supra note 199, 841-844; It should be noted that Germany’s
practice with respect to the international crimes committed during WWII has not been adopted
universally.  Japan, for example, has taken a markedly different path.  It has staunchly refused to pay
individual claims arising out of its WWII actions.  It has compensated some States for WWII-related
activities (roughly $3.9 billion to the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma and Indonesia).  It has also created a
‘consolation fund’ for former ‘comfort women’ of the Japanese Army.  However, compensation claims
in the Japanese courts and in the United States’ court system have failed due to, among other reasons,
statutes of limitations and the waivers found in the peace treaties signed after WWII.
244 As of July 2004, the overall amount of compensation made available by the UN Claims Commission
was $18 billion; See also Shelton, supra note 199, 852; ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL Study Rules, 542.
For information on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, see ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL Study
Rules, 542.
245 See also Bassiouni, supra note 198, 34; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 191, 175.
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As noted above, almost every regional human rights treaty guarantees a right to a
remedy (in one form or another). The practice of these regional systems has been very
instructive in fleshing out the contours of the right to reparations under international
law.
The IACtHR has, arguably, generated the most important jurisprudence on forms of
reparations other than, or in addition to, compensation.  It has stated consistently that
the obligation to provide reparations reflects a rule of customary law246 and has
ordered a wide range of innovative measures247 within the traditional categories:
restitution,248 compensation,249 rehabilitation,250 and satisfaction251 and guarantees of
non-repetition.252 Furthermore, the IACtHR has set up trust funds, appointed experts
and kept cases open in order to monitor the implementation of the ordered
remedies.253
In contrast, the European Court on Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has been very
conservative when ordering reparations, limiting its exercise for the most part to
246 Shelton, supra note 199, 841.
247 Faúndez Ledesma, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights: Institutional
and procedural aspects / Héctor Faúndez Ledesma. –- 3 ed. -- San José, C.R. :Instituto Interamericano
de Derechos Humanos, 2008.
248 The IACtHR has determined that the ideal outcome of a guarantee of “fair and adequate
compensation” is full restitution, i.e. the restoration of the status quo ante.  However, where this is not
possible, compensation is often required. De Greiff, Handbook, 455.
249 Examples of this category of reparation measures include reimbursement of cost and expenses.
250 Examples of this category of reparation measures include medical and psychological treatment.
251 Examples of this category of reparation measures include public apologies or symbolic memorials.
252 In general, reparations measures only benefit the direct victims of the human rights violation that
have been recognized as such in the first stages of the procedure before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and their next of kin. However, in some cases, with the aim to address
the causes of violations in order to prevent recurrence  the IACtHR, has also specified a range of
measures including investigation, prosecution and  punishment of those responsible, legislative and
institutional reforms, as well as training as “guarantees of non-repetition”. As a result of the
compliance of these measures, such judgments have had a wide effect, reaching individuals that have
not appeared as applicants before the Court but were suffering the same human rights violation. In this
respect, what is noteworthy about these types of measures are that at the same time of addressing the
problem of the limited access to the international system, have also secured in some aspects the
effective domestication of the American Convention. See:  IACtHR, Case of “The Last Temptation of
Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 5, 2001.
Series C No. 73
253 Shelton, supra note 199, 841.
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monetary reparation. Furthermore, the President of the Court has indicated that just
satisfaction254 does not automatically flow from the finding of a violation of the
ECHR or its Protocols.  Furthermore, the President stated that compensation will be
granted only in default of the domestic judicial system to guarantee a full reparation
and only “if necessary”.255
Finally, the case-law of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
shows a hesitation in making specific recommendations on awards for compensation
or other forms of reparations.  Instead, the Commission has preferred to declare a
violation and grant the State Party a measure of discretion in terms of the
implementation of the remedy.256
3.3.3 The right to reparations under the Rome Statute
As previously mentioned, one of the fundamental contributions of the Rome Statute to
the body of international criminal law is the provision of the right to reparations to
victims of crimes covered by the Statute.257 There are two key provisions in the Rome
Statute pertaining to this right to reparation. Article 75 relating to the right of
reparations to victims and Article 79 which establishes the Trust Fund for Victims
(TFV) for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and for
families of such victims. In relevant portion Article 75 provides that:
254 Article 41, ECHR.
255 President of the ECHR, Practice Direction, Just Satisfaction Claims. 28 March 2007, Available at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/8227A775-CD37-4F51-A4AA-
1797004BE394/0/PracticeDirectionsJustSatifactionClaims2007.pdf
256 Oette, in Ferstman et al, 219.
257 Haslam E, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A triumph of hope over
experience?’ in D. McGoldrick, P Rowe & E Donnely, The Permanent International Criminal Court:
Legal and Policies Issues (2004) 315-334.
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The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of,
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation… determine the
scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims
and will state the principles on which it is acting. 258
After making a determination as to the award, the Court is empowered to make an
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in
respect of, victims. The Court may order that such an award is made through the TFV.
Rules 94 to 96 RPE set out the procedures for reparations to victims. These rules
direct that the Court may invite to the reparations’ hearings not only the victims and
the convicted person, but also interested persons or interested States whose properties
could be affected by the rulings on reparations. Nevertheless, neither the Rome
Statute nor the RPE prescribe how these provisions regarding reparations will be
implemented.259
3.3.3.1 Decision establishing principles and procedures to be applied to
reparations
258 Article 75(1) Rome Statute; See Donat-Cattin D, ‘Article 68’ in Triffterer Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s notes article by article (1999) 965-1014 for a
history of the provision relating to the right to reparations.
259 Henzelin M, Heiskanen V & Mettraux G, ‘Reparations to Victims Before the International Criminal
Court: Lessons from international mass claims processes’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 317-344, at
338 noting that the ‘Statute and Rules do not provide…any predetermined mechanisms or procedures
for processing reparations claims and implementation of awards’.
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Trial Chamber I in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo established
the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations in August 2012.260 This
decision followed the Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute in the
same case where the accused Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was found guilty of the war
crimes that he was charged – including conscripting or enlisting children under the
age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups and using them to participate on the
hostilities. This is the first decision by the Court interpreting the right to reparations
and sets important benchmarks and foundations in the reparations regime and
victimology in international criminal justice.
In terms of the procedure that was followed in the determination of the Court’s
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations in line with the RPE, the Trial
Chamber granted leave for submissions from the following parties before making its
final determination on the matter: the Office of the Prosecutor; The Defence of the
convicted person; Legal Representatives of Victims; the Registry; Office of Public
Counsel for Victims; Trust Fund for Victims; and Other parties: Women’s Initiatives
for Gender Justice; International Centre for Transitional Justice, UNICEF, Fondation
Congolaise pour la Promotion des Droits humains et la Paix, Avocats sans Frontières
and certain other Non-Governmental Organisations.261
In establishing the principles relating to reparations pursuant to Article 75 (1) of the
Rome Statute, the Chamber recognized that the ‘Statute and the Rules reflect a
growing recognition in international criminal law that there is a need to go beyond the
260 See Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations in the case of
the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/6 [hereinafter Reparations
Decision].
261 Requests to appear before the Chamber and make submissions are made pursuant to Regulation
81(4) (b) of the Regulations of the Court on issues related to reparations.
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notion of punitive justice, towards a solution which is more inclusive.’262 This
recognition is in keeping with established standards of international human rights law
and particularly the 2005 UN Basic Principles. The Chamber took note of the 2004
Report of the United Nations Secretary General on The rule of law and transitional
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies.263 The two main purposes for reparations
according to the Chamber are that they oblige those responsible for crimes to repair
the harm that they have caused and to enable the Chamber to ensure that offenders
account for their acts.264
Within the context of transitional justice, the Chamber also recognized that
reparations have the added advantage of promoting reconciliation between the
convicted person, the victims of the crimes and the affected communities. This
statement has received conflicting reactions amongst transitional justice practitioners
who are intimately aware of the situation in Ituri where the convicted person Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo comes from. The conflict in Ituri, which the convicted person was a
central part of, was one between the Hema and the Lendu communities. It is alleged
that some of the children who joined the convicted person’s rebellion, did so out of
their own volition or were ‘volunteered’ by their parents and communities to fight the
opposing group. Since the crimes that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted of
involved the recruitment and use of children from his own community, the direct
victims of the case in point and possibly direct beneficiaries of reparations are the
child soldiers and their immediate families, from the convicted person’s Hema
262 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, para 177.
263 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, footnote 367; See also The rule of law and transitional justice
in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General s/2004/616, 23
August 2004; Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through
action to combat impunity, Report of the independent expert Diane Orentlicher,
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005
264 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, para 179;
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community. The question is asked by the victims of the crimes committed by the child
soldiers from the Lendu community as to how the reparations process would promote
reconciliation between the two communities if the direct beneficiaries of the
reparations will be the Hema community. These are some difficult situations
presented in a post-conflict community and exacerbate the tension between the
objectives of peace and justice.265 The Chamber has however noted that, for purposes
of application of principles of reparations under the Rome Statute, the Court will
adopt a broad and flexible interpretation to give the widest possible remedies
available to victims and evaluations on a case-by-case basis.266
The Chamber established the following principles:
a) Principle of Dignity, non-discrimination and non-stigmatisation – all
victims regardless of their participation in the trial proceedings or not, will be
treated fairly and equally.267 This principle may have the desired effect of
curbing the increasing volumes of applications from victims to participate in
proceedings at the Court discussed in an earlier section. This is the case where
the principles are publicised effectively to victims and affected communities
that reparations will take a non-discriminatory application.268
265 ICC Press Release, ICC-CPU-20121121-PR856 of 21 November 2012 ‘Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui
case: ICC Trial Chamber II Severs Charges’…announces that the verdict in the case against Mathieu
Ngudjolo will be issued on December 18, 2012. If he is found guilty of the crimes with which he is
charged, there will be the possibility of reparation proceedings for purposes of addressing the harm
caused to victims of his crimes. There is a wider
266 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras 180-181.
267 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, para 187
268 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras 258 and 259 where the Chamber pronounced that the
responsibility of the publicity of the principles lies with the Registry and that its outreach activities with
national authorities and local communities is encouraged.
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b) Principles on Beneficiaries – the beneficiaries of reparations are both direct
and indirect victims pursuant to Rule 85 RPE. As a direct victim may be clear,
an indirect victim status may not be as clear. The Chamber will determine an
indirect victim as for example the parents of a child soldier.269 Legal entities
may also benefit as victims but priority may be given to certain victims in
vulnerable situations such as victims of sexual and gender-based violence.270
c) Principle on Accessibility and consultation with victims – the Chamber
endorsed a gender-inclusive approach to all principles with sufficient
consultations with victims in situ paying particular attention to their
priorities.271
d) Principle on Victims of sexual violence – victims include women and girls,
and boys and men alike. Reparations awards for this group of victims require a
specialist, integrated and multidisciplinary approach particularly to meet
obstacles faced by women and girls when seeking access to justice.272
e) Principle on Child victims – reparations decisions will be guided by the
fundamental principle of the “best interests of the child” enshrined in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Where child soldiers are victims,
269 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras 194-195
270 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras 197-200.
271 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras 202-206.
272 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras. 207-209.
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reparations programs must include their re-integration into society and
rehabilitation to promote reconciliation within society.273
f) Principle on the Scope of reparations – the Chamber recognized the
uncertainty in the number of victims in the case and despite the volumes of
applications from victims, these numbers are not representatives of the totality
of victims. The Chamber endorsed the use of both individual and collective
reparations noting that the two are not mutually exclusive and may be awarded
concurrently.274 When collective reparations are awarded, they should address
the harm suffered by victims on an individual and collective basis.275
g) Principle on the Modalities of reparations – a comprehensive approach to
reparations was adopted, including restitution, compensation (requires broad
application consistent with international human rights law assessments of
harm and damage), rehabilitation. The Chamber reserved a non-exhaustive list
of the forms of reparations not excluding those with symbolic, preventative
and transformative value.276
273 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras. 210-216.
274 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras. 217-220; See also Appeals Chamber Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December
2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, para. 36.
275 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, para. 221.
276 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras. 222-241.
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h) Principle on Proportional and adequate reparations – reparations should
support programmes that are self-sustaining and benefits paid by periodic
instalments rather than by way of lump-sum.277
i) Principle on Causation – the Court should not be limited to “direct” harm or
the “immediate effects” of the crime, particularly in this case involving child
soldiers, but instead the Court should apply the standard of “proximate cause”.
The Court must be satisfied that there exists a “but/for” relationship between
the crime and the harm.278
j) Principle on the Standard and Burden of Proof – as the trial stage is
concluded when an order of reparations is considered, the appropriate standard
of a balance of probabilities is sufficient. Where the reparations award
emanates from the TFV a more flexible approach is to be taken.279 These kinds
of awards are akin to what has become known as the second mandate
operations and assistance of the TFV in situation countries of the Court
outside of a judicial determination of guilt or innocence of an accused person.
In conclusion, the Chamber asserted the principle respecting the rights of the defence
in that nothing in the abovementioned principles will prejudice or be inconsistent with
the rights of the convicted person to a fair and impartial trial.280
277 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras. 242-246.
278 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras 247-250.
279 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, paras. 251-254.
280 Reparations Decision, supra note 260, para. 255
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Chapter IV
Enforcement Mechanisms to Secure International
Cooperation
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Enforcement of Sentences under the Rome Statute
4.3 Horizontal Cooperation among States on Enforcement
4.4 Vertical Cooperation among States on Enforcement
4.5 Cooperation of States in Enforcement of Sentences under the Rome Statute
4.5.1 Ensuring the cooperation of States in the enforcement of sentences of
imprisonment
4.5.2 Ensuring the cooperation of States in the enforcement of fines and
forfeitures
4.5.3 Ensuring the cooperation of States in the enforcement of reparations
orders
4.6 Concluding remarks
The need to continue codifying international law is apparent . . . But an even greater
challenge for us now--and, in many respects an even greater opportunity--is
enforcement. Although international law is often caricatured as elusive and abstract,
there is nothing abstract about its enforcement . . . .
--Madeleine Albright281
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter interrogates the enforcement mechanisms under the Rome Statute.
Unlike States, the Court does not have an enforcement entity such as a Police Force
281 Albright MK, ‘International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century: A U.S. Perspective on
Enforcement’, (1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal, 1595, 1596
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that would arrest persons accused of committing crimes within its jurisdiction,
conduct searches and seizures or compel witnesses to appear before the Court. Yet,
the Court must critically assess its practice of enforcing sentences that it imposes on
convicted persons and in its contribution to restorative justice, the enforcement of
reparations orders in collaboration with other Rome Statute entities such as the TFV.
The enforcement of sentences is an indispensable part of international criminal
justice. In fact it may be called the backbone of the system of international criminal
justice.282 Even against this background, Kress and Sluiter note that doctrinal writings
on the enforcement of international criminal sentences are few yet critically needed to
prepare for the enforcement regime of the Court.283 As with many other topics in
international criminal law – including those discussed earlier in this thesis on state
cooperation in Chapter I, complementarity in Chapter II, the rights of persons at
various stages of Court proceedings and processes in Chapter III – enforcement as
governed by Part X of the Rome Statute read together with the relevant provisions of
the RPE is the first elaborated codification and documentation of enforcement of
international criminal sentences. At the time of this writing, the Court has rendered its
first Judgment and Sentence against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.284 In the same case, the
Court has established the first ever set of principles and procedures for the application
of the reparations regime etched in the Rome Statute.285 It is beneficial at this stage to
reflect on the provisions on enforcement of sentences as well as of reparations orders
by the Court with a view to contributing to the strengthening of the enforcement
282 Kress C & Sluiter G ‘Preliminary Remarks’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
A Commentary Volume II (Cassese A, Gaeta P and Jones JRW eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 1751-1756 [hereinafter Kress and Sluiter Preliminary Remarks], 1752
283 Kress and Sluiter Preliminary Remarks, supra note 282, 1755
284 Refer to the footnote in Chapter III on this decision
285 See Chapter III which analyses the principles and practices on the application of reparations under
the Rome Statute
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regime of the Court and setting the point of departure for future Court determined
sentences and reparations orders.
4.2 ENFORCEMENT OF SENTENCES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
Part X of the Rome Statute clarifies that the enforcement relates to the regulations
concerning the sentence that the Court has ordered for a convicted person as well as
the enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures of the assets of a person who has
been sentenced. There is an immediate connection between the enforcement of
sentences with Part IX of the Rome Statute dealing with the cooperation of States
with the Court. Article 103 elucidates the role of States in the enforcement of
sentences of imprisonment. As mentioned previously, the Court does not have an
enforcement agency and relies entirely on States to enforce sentences of
imprisonment. States Parties are therefore acting in concert or in cooperation with the
Court, in the enforcement regime under the Statute. Rule 199 RPE provides that ‘the
functions of the Court under Part 10 shall be exercised by the Presidency’.286 The
Presidency287 shall designate a State drawn from a list of states maintained by the
Registry288 in which a convicted person shall serve a sentence of imprisonment.289 In
indicating their willingness and acceptance to enforce the sentences of imprisonment,
States ‘may attach conditions to its acceptance’290, which the Presidency is not
obliged to accept but may request for additional clarity before making a decision to
286 Rule 199 RPE
287 The Presidency is one of four Organs of the Court established under Article 34 Rome Statute.
According to Article 38 (3) ‘…the Presidency…shall be responsible for:
(a) The proper administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor;
and
(b) The other functions conferred upon it in accordance with this Statute.’
288 According to Rule 200 (1) RPE, the Registry of the Court shall maintain a list of states which
indicate their willingness to enforce a sentence of imprisonment for persons convicted by the Court.
289 Article 103 (1) (a) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
290 Article 103 (1) (b) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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include or exclude such a State from the list of states which will enforce sentences
issued by the Court.291
The drafters of the Rome Statute in this Part maintained the sovereignty of states to
determine what conditions in accordance with their national laws and procedures they
would maintain in the enforcement of sentences. In the same breath, the drafters also
wanted the Court to maintain a measure of control in the enforcement regime under
the Statute. Every state has its unique laws and procedures of enforcement. Kress and
Sluiter make this distinct point that states ‘…distinguish the enforcement rules
governing the question of whether to enforce from those governing the question of
how to enforce’.292 For some states the question of whether and how to enforce is
governed by national criminal procedure legislation, while in others the two are
treated separately and governed by different legislation.293 In an effort to harmonise
the enforcement regime, the Court must then be seen as the ultimate overseer while
maintaining state autonomy to determine conditions for enforcement. Article 106 (1)
Rome Statute supports this position. It provides that,
“The enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the
supervision of the Court and shall be consistent with widely accepted
international treaty standards governing the treatment of prisoners.”
Article 106(1) introduces the concept of ‘international treaty standards governing the
treatment of prisoners’ to the enforcement regime under the Rome Statute. These
standards are traced to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
291 Rule 200 (2) RPE
292 Kress and Sluiter Preliminary Remarks, supra note 282, 1751
293 Kress and Sluiter Preliminary Remarks supra note 282, 1751 give the example of the United States
where the law of corrections, which relates to how to enforce, are governed by the law of corrections,
which is entirely separate from the law of criminal procedure in the United States.
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adopted by the United Nations on 31 July 1957.294 These standard rules may be said
to reflect customary international law.295 They were adopted at a time when the
enforcement of prison sentences for convicted persons by the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg faced a measure of criticism. On 1 October 1946, the
IMT at Nuremberg rendered its judgment in twenty-two major German war criminals.
Three of the accused were acquitted.296 Of those convicted, the IMT at Nuremberg
imposed twelve death sentences297, three terms of life imprisonment298, two terms of
twenty years’ imprisonment299, one term of fifteen years’ imprisonment300, and one
term ten years’ imprisonment.301 The London Charter that established the IMT at
Nuremberg did not provide for appellate proceedings following the trial stage. Once
the judgment was issued, the enforcement stage followed. Article 29(1) of the London
Charter provided the framework for enforcement. It states:
“In the case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accordance with the
orders of the Allied Control Council for Germany, which may at any time
reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not increase the severity
thereof.”302
The Allied Control Council for Germany (ACCG) operated less on legal
considerations than it did on the political. The Council enforced prison sentences at
the allied military prison at Berlin Spandau from 18 July 1947. The conditions of the
294 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the United Nations on 31 July
1957 ECOSOC Res. 663 C (XXIV), amended by ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII), 13 May 1977
295 Rodley, N.S., The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (1999) 278-279;
296 Fritzcshe, von Papen, and Schacht.
297 For Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenburg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel, Johl,
Seyß-Inquart and Bormann.
298 For Heß, Funk and Raeder.
299 For Schirach and Speer.
300 For Neurath.
301 For Dönitz.
302 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and
Establishment of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), 82 U.N.T.S. (1951)
279[hereinafter London Charter], Article 29(1).
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imprisonment were said to be particularly hostile to the seven convicted persons.
Although the rules at Spandau were eventually relaxed, it was clear that the objective
of the allied powers in enforcing the sentences of the seven had very little to do with
their rehabilitation.
The situation was not very different at the IMT at Tokyo. Section V of the Charter of
the IMT for the Far East (IMTFE) set out the applicable penalties, as well as the
method of enforcement. Article 17 on sentences reads
“…will be carried out in accordance with the Order of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), who may at any time reduce or
otherwise alter the sentence, except to increase its severity.”
Of the twenty-five accused, seven were sentenced to death303, sixteen to life
imprisonment304, one to twenty years305 and one to seven years.306 Sentences were
served at the Japanese prison of Sugamo in Tokyo.307 Unlike the enforcement regime
of the IMT at Nuremberg, which was enforced by the four allied countries that of the
IMTFE at Tokyo was enforced by Japan. In this sense, the IMT at Nuremberg
represents a precedent for a multi-national enforcement regime. The conditions of
imprisonment however were not very favourable to the prisoners, although there was
a measure of grace accorded to the prisoners at Sugamo compared to those in
Spandau.
303 Doihara, Hirota, Itagaki, Kimura, Matsui, Muto and Tojo.
304 Araki, Hashimoto, Hata, Hiranuma, Hoshino, Kaya, Kido, Koiso, Minami, Oka, Oshima, Sato,
Shimada, Shiratori, Suzuki, and Umezu.
305 Togo.
306 Shigemitsu.
307 Kress C & Sluiter G ‘Imprisonment’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary Volume II (Cassese A, Gaeta P and Jones JRW eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 1757-1821 [hereinafter Kress and Sluiter Imprisonment], 1762-4.
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The striking similarity in both enforcement regimes however is the political
considerations that went into decision making at both ACCG and SCAP. Political
sensitivities and considerations did not fade away in the debates at the UNSC
following the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994, as did the IMT, IMFTE
and the enforcement institutions created thereunder. Rwanda, then a member of the
UNSC voted against the Security Council Resolution 995 that established the ICTR,
inter alia, on the ground that sentences of accused persons would be enforced in other
countries but Rwanda and that the countries that will enforce the sentences would
determine the nature of how the sentences will be carried out. Rwanda, dissatisfied
with this position, argued that this must be ‘for the International Tribunal or at least
the Rwandese people to decide’.308
The designation of a State of enforcement following a conviction at the ICTR is
governed by Article 26 ICTR Statute and Rule 103 ICTR RPE. The place of
imprisonment from these provisions includes Rwanda.309 Article 27 of the ICTY
Statute on the other hand does not specify what country the prison sentence shall be
served save that a list of willing States will guide the relevant Chamber.
4.3 HORIZONTAL COOPERATION AMONG STATES ON ENFORCEMENT
308 UN Doc. S/PV.3453, 15 (1994)
309 Rule 103 (A) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence reads as follows:
(A) Imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any State designated by the Tribunal from a
list of States which have indicated their willingness to accept convicted persons for the
serving of sentences. Prior to the decision on placement of imprisonment, the Chamber
shall notify the Government of Rwanda.
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From a completely utilitarian perspective, states have the common objective of
preventing and suppressing criminality.310 There exists international cooperation
among states on the enforcement of sentences of imprisonment. States are in the
practice of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements with each other to ensure
that the objective of preventing and suppressing criminality is achieved.311 Abdul-
Aziz posits that in these agreements, a State may wish that its nationals convicted
abroad complete their sentences in their national state.312 The views of the convicted
person are weighed in the decision to transfer enforcement of prison term.
Kress and Sluiter discuss two techniques employed by states in the enforcement of
sentences. The first is the ‘conversion’ technique where a requesting state313 enforces
the sentence and has the advantage of assuring itself that the trial resulting in the
conviction was fair and that the penalty inflicted is not disproportionate. The second
technique is one of ‘continued enforcement’ where the requesting state directly
enforces and implements the sentence within the legal order of the requested state.314
4.4 VERTICAL COOPERATION AMONG STATES ON ENFORCEMENT
Vertical cooperation among states on the enforcement of prison sentences refers to the
relationship and/or obligations of states with respect to the sentences ordered by the
310 Abdul-Aziz M, “Transfer of Prisoners: International Perspective”, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.),
International Criminal Law, Vol. II. Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms (2nd edn., 1999), 488 et
seq. [hereinafter Abdul-Aziz]
311 Plachta M, Transfer of Prisoners under International Instruments and Domestic Legislation (1993)
143[hereinafter Plachta], identifies the agreement between Lebanon and Syria in 1951 as the first inter-
state treaty on this point.
312 Abdul-Aziz, supra note 310, 250.
313 A requesting state is one where the convicted person will serve the sentence in imprisonment, often
the state of nationality. The requested state is the state that conducts the trial of an accused and
convicts.
314 Kress and Sluiter Imprisonment, supra note 307, 1767.
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ICTY and ICTR. As previously mentioned, Article 27 ICTY Statute provides for the
designation of a State that will enforce prison sentences. Rule 103 ICTY RPE and
Practice Directions on the Procedure for the International Tribunal’s Designation
(Practice Directions) of the State in which a Convicted Person is to Serve his/her
Sentence of Imprisonment guide the ICTY in this regard.315 Tolbert notes that in
practice, there is no obligation on States to provide this form of cooperation with the
ICTY or even the ICTR. States would have to be persuaded to provide the ad hoc
Tribunals with assistance in this regard.316 Persuasion would take the form of
requiring States to ensure that the domestic legislation meets the Tribunals satisfaction
of guarantees for the regulation of enforcement modalities. The ad hoc Tribunals
would then sign an enforcement agreement with the particular State.317 Such
agreements are guided by two principles that were established in the Sentence
Judgment in the case of the Prosecutor v. Drazen Еrdemović: respect for the duration
of the penalty as imposed by the Chamber and respect for international rules
governing the conditions of imprisonment.318 Kress and Sluiter emphasize that unlike
the bialteral agreements between States that allows the concerns of the convicted
person to be considered in the decision to effect transfer of enforcement of sentence,
the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, RPE, Practice Directions and case law do not indicate
315 Practice Directions on the Procedure for the International Tribunal’s Designation were issued by the
ICTY President on 9 July 1998.
316 Tolbert D, ‘The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Enforcement of
Sentences’, 11 Leiden Journal of International Law (1998) 655, 658.
317 Such agreements have been concluded between the ICTY and Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Norway, Pakistan, Spain and Sweden. Benin,
Mali and Swaziland are the three African countries that have such an agreement with the ICTR. For the
ICTR, the challenge and criticism has been that the convicted persons should not serve their terms of
imprisonment in the ‘comfortable’ prisons in Western countries. Many of the convicted persons by the
ICTR remain in the UN Detention Facility at Arusha for long period of time before being transferred to
a State to serve their terms of imprisonment. Some of the convicted persons would complete their
sentences at the UN Detention Facility.
318 Sentencing Judgment, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovič, IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996, para 34.
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any duty for the President of the ICTY or ICTR to obtain the views of the convicted
person on the designation of the State of enforcement.319
In as much as the ad hoc Tribunals provide a framework for vertical cooperation
among states for enforcement of sentencing, there are some outstanding issues that
remain unresolved to-date. Since the first convictions and sentencing in both ad hoc
Tribunals, some of the convicted persons have since completed their terms of
imprisonment but there has not been a standard mechanism to deal with their release
into society. Some of the reasons for this include the unwillingness on the part of
States to accept these individuals into their countries. It is often the case that the State
of nationality of the individual may not be safe or even willing to receive the
individual. The Completion Strategies of the ad hoc Tribunals also do not pronounce
much on enforcement of sentences save for isolated cases.320 Nevertheless, the
experiences of the ad hoc Tribunals will be of great persuasive value to the Court's
Presidency with respect to the enforcement of sentences.
4.5 COOPERATION OF STATES IN ENFORCEMENT OF SENTENCES
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
The ILC Draft Statute provided for a general obligation on the part of States to
recognize and enforce judgments of the Court.321 This obligation to recognize would
have meant that States parties to the Rome Statute had a direct obligation to cooperate
319 Kress & Sluiter Imprisonment, supra note 307, 1775
320Articles 12 of the Enforcement Agreements between the UN, Mali and Benin concerning ICTR
Sentences provide that, ‘in the event that the Tribunal is to be wound up; the Registrar will inform the
Security Council of any sentences whose enforcement remains to be completed pursuant to this
agreement.’
321 Draft Statute of the International Law Commission UN Doc. A/49/10 [hereinafter ILC Draft
Statute], Article 93(1)
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with the Court to enforce sentences. The drafters of the Rome Statute had explicitly
made room for the obligation to cooperate with the Court in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes.322 Such an obligation to recognize and enforce Court
judgments would possibly have dispensed with the Court’s requirement to conclude
specific agreements with States on enforcement, at least to the details of consent from
the State as this is presumed from signature and ratification of the Rome Statute as a
whole and concomitantly with the obligation of States Parties to cooperate in this
enforcement. There was no consensus among States in Rome concerning the
provision on recognition and thus it was deleted from the final draft in Rome. States
found a solution to the ‘questions of how to determine the State of enforcement323,
and how to ensure the supervision of the enforcement by the ICC324 and once it was
decided how to deal with the issue of enforcement of fines and forfeiture orders325
exhaustively’326, which in their opinion dispensed with the need for a general clause
obliging States to recognize the enforcement mechanism. There is therefore no
general obligation on States Parties to cooperate with the Court in enforcement of
sentences of imprisonment in the Rome Statute. The same however cannot be said of
enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures, which shall be discussed below.
4.5.1 Ensuring the cooperation of States in the enforcement of sentences of
imprisonment
322 Article 86 Rome Statute, supra note 1; See also Chapter I which discusses the general obligation of
States Parties to fully cooperate with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within its
jurisdiction.
323 Articles 103 and 104 Rome Statute, supra note 1.
324 Articles 105 and 106 Rome Statute, supra note 1.
325 Article 109 Rome Statute, supra note 1.
326 Kress and Sluiter Imprisonment, supra note 307, 1786.
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As explained above, a majority of the delegates at the Rome conference rejected an
obligatory enforcement regime in the ILC Draft Statute in favour of the opt-in
mechanism espoused in Article 103. Once a State on its own volition accepts to
enforce the sentences of imprisonment and has been listed as such by the Court’s
Registry327, the Rome Statute gives the Court a measure of control over the
enforcement mechanisms. Article 104 (1) reads that the ‘Court may, at any time,
decide to transfer a sentenced person to a prison of another State.’ Article 105 also
ensures that ‘the Court alone shall have the right to decide and application for appeal
and revision’. The supervisory power of the Court over the enforcement of sentences
and conditions of imprisonment is made possible because of the permanent stature of
the Court, unlike the ad hoc Tribunals. It is therefore possible for the Presidency to set
up a mechanism to monitor and promote cooperation with States that opt to enforce
prison sentences.
4.5.2 Ensuring the cooperation of States in the enforcement of fines and
forfeitures
This form of enforcement is in comparison more sensitive to deal with that that of
prison sentences. For starters, in current Court practice the enforcement is not
applicable. Article 109 Rome Statute regulates enforcement if fines and forfeiture
measures. It reads
1. States Parties shall give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by the Court
under Part 7, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, and
in accordance with the procedure of their national law
327 Rule 200 (1) RPE
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2. If a State Party is unable to give effect to an order for forfeiture, it shall
take measures to recover the value of the proceeds, property or assets
ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the rights of bona
fide third parties.
3. Property, or proceeds of the sale of real property or, where appropriate, the
sale of other property, which is obtained by a State Party as a result of its
enforcement of a judgment of the Court shall be transferred to the Court.
This article limits the enforcement of fines and forfeiture to those ordered by the
Court under Article 77 (2) Rome Statute. The relevant portion provides that:
“…the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;
(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly
from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.”
Article 109 does not cover the fines imposed by the Court related to an offence
against the administration of justice328 or provisional measures to secure evidentiary
forfeiture.329 There is however a close relation between the cooperation regime under
Part IX of the Rome Statute and the enforcement of fines and forfeiture. From the
language of the provision, States Parties are obliged to enforce fines and forfeiture
orders. Rule 217 RPE elucidates that this obligation however does not automatically
apply to States Parties, but rather that the Presidency must make a request to a State
Party in accordance with Part IX of the Rome Statute dealing with cooperation.330 It
328 Article 70 (2) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
329 Article 93 (1) (k) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
330 Rule 271 RPE reads
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remains however the prerogative of States Parties to give effect to fines or forfeiture
orders in accordance with their national legislation governing such orders as
expressed in Article 93 (1) (k) Rome Statute.
The Court has yet to enforce fines or forfeitures in the context of convicted persons.
To date only one person has been convicted by the Court, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. At
the commencement of the pre-trial phase, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was declared
indigent. In addition, the forfeiture of property relates to property that a convicted
person acquired in the commission of the crimes s/he is convicted. It is not
immediately clear that the rebel group that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo led acquired
property in the course of the conflict in Ituri, although it is not so far removed an idea
considering the mineral-rich eastern DRC. The challenge for the Court in this regard
would be the identification of the assets of accused persons and here cooperation from
States would support the process.
4.5.3 Ensuring the cooperation of States in the enforcement of reparations orders
Article 75(5) of the Rome Statute provides that ‘a State Party shall give effect to a
decision under this article as if the provision of article 109 were applicable to this
article.’ This reference suggests that there is a separate enforcement of fines and
forfeitures to the enforcement of reparations orders. In addition the mandatory
For the enforcement of fines, forfeitures or reparation orders, the Presidency shall, as
appropriate, seek compensation and measures for enforcement in accordance with Part 9, as
well as transmit copies of relevant orders to an State with the sentences person appear to have
direct connection by reason of wither nationality, domicile or habitual residence or by virtue
of the location of the sentenced person’s assets and property or with which the victim has such
a connection. The Presidency shall, as appropriate, inform the State of any third-party claims
or the fact that no claim was presented by a person who received notification of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to article 75.
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language used in Article 75(5) places an obligatory enforcement regime on States
Parties over reparations orders.
Kress and Sluiter advance that there is no practice of horizontal cooperation of states
on enforcement of reparations for victims of international crimes.331 The development
of the reparations regime in international criminal justice has not been as fast as other
components of international criminal law. The practice at the ad hoc Tribunals is
limited in terms of enforcement of reparations orders. The enforcement of orders by
the ad hoc Tribunals is limited to the return of stolen property or proceeds from the
sale of such property.332 The obligation by States to enforce the orders of the ad hoc
Tribunals is expressed in terms of the general duty to cooperate with the ad hoc
Tribunals.333 In the case of the Prosecutor v. Milošević et al., the ICTY ordered the
provisional freezing of the assets of the accused following the Prosecutor’s
application under Rule 105 ICTY RPE for purposes of granting restitution.334 This
order was transmitted to the UN Member States although there is no evidence of how
vertical cooperation as described in Chapter I would have been executed by States in
fulfilment of the ICTY’s order.
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Court has now established principles and practices for the application of
reparations as discussed in Chapter III following the reparations order in the
331 Kress C & Sluiter G ‘Fines and Forfeiture Orders’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary Volume II (Cassese A, Gaeta P and Jones JRW eds) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 1823-1848 [hereinafter Kress and Sluiter Fines and Forfeiture Orders], 1833
332 For example in Article 24(3) ICTY Statute
333 Article 29(1) ICTY Statute and
334 Decision on Review of Indictment and Application for Consequential Orders, Prosecutor v.
Slobodan Miloševič et al., 24 May 1999, IT-99-37, para. 27.
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Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga case. The practice of awarding reparations for victims
of international crimes has only just began, while the debate on the national
reparations programmes for victims and affected communities of international crimes
is steadily gaining traction. It will probably take some more time for inter-State
practice on the enforcement of criminal law reparations orders to develop. The only
precedent that exists for the enforcement of reparations orders is the case law of the
ICTY. In the course of the negotiations on the enforcement of reparations orders
under the Rome Statute, there was a proposal from the French delegation to include
the attachment of an accused’s property, assets or money once an order under Article
75 Rome Statute had been made. This proposal was rejected on the grounds that
delegations denied the existence of an obligation for States Parties to cooperate with
the Court for purposes of adopting protective measures in the field of reparations.335
335 Kress and Sluiter Fines and Forfeiture Orders, supra note 49, 1834
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CHAPTER V
Concluding Remarks
The Court is a permanent institution. In comparison to international law norms
regulating the conduct of parties in hostilities and armed conflict, or those norms
which govern the inalienable and ‘non-derogable’ rights of an individual, the Rome
Statutes establishes new values and norms that have been in practice for a long period
of time. Some of these norms have been assessed in this thesis under the general
rubric of cooperation of States generally336 and specifically in relation to
complementary national jurisdictions,337 the rights of certain persons who appear
before the Court338 and the enforcement of sentences and orders of the Court.339 The
Rome Statute also codifies for the first time in a multilateral treaty, the prosecution of
serious violations of the rules governing the conduct of parties in armed conflict
considered as a part of customary international law. The origins of these relatively
new norms of international criminal justice are therefore embedded in the ‘tried and
tested’ norms in international humanitarian law and international human rights law.
When a critical reflection and assessment of the cooperation regime under the Rome
Statute is done, it is clear that there are several challenges that threaten to render the
regime ineffective. It may be useful to provide some recommendations that identify
opportunities to strengthen the cooperation regime established under Part IX of the
Rome Statute.
336 See Chapter I on International Cooperation with the International Criminal Court.
337 See Chapter II on The Principle of Complementarity: Kenya’s challenge of cooperating with the
Court.
338 See Chapter III on The Rights of the Accused, Victims of International Crimes and Witnesses
Appearing Before the Court.
339 See Chapter IV on Enforcement Mechanisms to Secure International Cooperation.
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The structural weaknesses that characterise the system have been identified more so in
the tenuous relationship between the Court, the AU and the UNSC.  As the two latter
bodies function mostly form a political perspective, it may be important for the Court
to assert its judicial functions by making pronouncements that regulate what seem to
be contentious issues around cooperation. These pronouncements should buttress not
only the general obligation of States Parties to cooperate fully with the Court, but the
specific aspects that would strengthen the domestic criminal jurisdictions to fulfil its
treaty-based obligations. Perhaps there also is a need for a shift in focus from
perceived neo-imperialist arguments advanced against the Court to the engine room of
the Court to evaluate what does work and what does not work.  In this connection,
there should be a greater emphasis on the part of both the States Parties to the Rome
Statute and the Court on the domestication of implementing legislation at State –level
to facilitate a robust and fully functional international cooperation regime.
The UNSC plays an important role as one of the trigger mechanisms for investigation
and prosecution by the Court in terms of Articles 13(b), 15 ter and 16 of the Rome
Statute. As the Court is still in its infancy stage and in need of legitimacy especially in
States that are aggrieved by its modus operandi in the first ten years since the Court
began its work, it will need the institutional support of the UNSC. Whereas reform of
the UN is outside the scope of this thesis, the UNSC as it is currently constituted must
exercise its Chapter VII powers given to it by the Charter of the UN to maintain
regional peace and security to the exclusion of political considerations that undermine
the Courts functions. As non-permanent members of the UNSC as it is currently
constituted are selected from the different regions of the world, the UNSC may want
to pay particular emphasis on a consultative process with regional representatives
where a situation merits the attention of the Court. It may also be beneficial to invite
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representatives of a situation under UNSC consideration to the deliberations of UNSC
action relating to the Court. Coincidentally, Rwanda was a non-permanent member of
the UNSC from 1994 to 1995 when deliberations concerning the establishment of the
ICTR took place following the genocide in that country in 1994. The views and
concerns of the concerned State, whether a Party or non-State Party of the Rome
Statute, and other actors such as civil society organisations working in the situation
under UNSC consideration may positively influence UNSC decision making relating
to its Rome Statute powers. These consultative processes have the capacity to promote
effective cooperation between States and the Court, when the jurisdiction of the Court
is invoked in a country that has been referred by the UNSC.
Regional integration bodies inter alia: the AU, the European Union (“EU”) and the
Organisation of American States (“OAS”) have a role to play to strengthen the Court.
There already exists an international mechanism to deal with the investigations and
prosecutions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide through the
auspices of the Rome Statute, specifically created as a treaty entity by the community
of States. It is counter-productive to the suppression of these crimes and the objects of
justice for victims when regional integration bodies embark on the creation of new
supranational courts akin to the existing Court, whatever the reasons may be. More
than 160 governments participated in the conference that adopted the Rome Statute.
This number represents more than two-thirds of the nations on earth. In the
negotiations for a permanent international criminal court, not once is it recorded that
States preferred to establish or endow regional courts with international criminal
jurisdiction. Rather, States were interested in enhancing national as well as the
Court’s capacity to deal with these heinous crimes. Regional bodies may however
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support the Court’s cooperation regime by advocating for the universalization of the
Rome Statute and focus energies on accession to the Rome Statute for their member
States who are not Party to the Rome Statute. In addition, regional bodies, especially
the AU should conclude cooperation agreements with the Court that would delineate
specific roles and responsibilities of both the Court and the regional body under the
shared objective of fighting against impunity.
The enhancement of national criminal jurisdictions to deal with international crimes is
key process that States should embark on. The real intention of the 160 governments
represented in Rome prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute was that their
sovereignty to deal with their nationals who are alleged to have committed war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide remains intact. As discussed in Chapter
II, it is in the interests of all States, whether Party or non-Party to the Rome Statute to
have criminal justice systems that would address these crimes in a genuine fashion.
Where any given State finds a lacunae in its national legislation incapacitating it from
dealing with international crimes, it must seek to immediately remedy such a
situation. The responsibility to build the capacity of such states is however not the
sole responsibility of the individual State. The principle of positive complementarity
envisages that other States as well as the Court can build the capacity of States to
investigate and prosecute international crimes. The Court, its staff and growing
jurisprudence has thematic expertise that would be useful in strengthening national
criminal justice systems. This form of cooperation only serves to strengthen States to
fight against impunity for international crimes as well as deal with specific thematic
issues such as the protection of witnesses and victims that are key for the work of
national criminal justice systems.
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National criminal justice systems that are strengthened would be able to respond to
requests for the enforcement of Court sentences and orders. As it is clear that there is
no general obligation on States Parties to enforce the Court’s sentences, the Court
relies on States for the enforcement. In fact, the solution of many of the Court’s
challenges lie in the strengthening of national criminal justice systems. The Court
remains the last resort to deal with international crimes and to redress victims of these
crimes. The concept of localised trials should be extended the reparations regime.
Although this was not addressed in detail in this thesis, strengthened national criminal
justice systems includes the extension of States’ capacity to deal with the right to
reparations at the national level. Ideally, such capacity would also assist in the
enforcement of Court ordered reparations.
A relationship of cooperation between the Court and States Parties is the lifeline of
the Court and more importantly the legitimization of the international criminal justice
system. It will take the concerted efforts of States to develop the international justice
system and put into practice the theory behind the system – the enforcement of a
rules-based system that protects children, women and men from atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity.
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